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INTRODUCTION 
It all started with a pimp and a prostitute—or, at least, two individuals 
posing as such.
1
  The duo walked into the field office of a fair housing 
organization, openly seeking funding to operate a brothel.
2
  The 
organization, one reliant on congressional funding, listened to the duo‘s 
inquiry and seemingly assisted the couple in achieving their illicit activity; 
the exchange was caught on videotape.
3
   
The two were hardly hustler and harlot; rather, they were political 
activists seeking to bring the organization down through a self-inspired 
sting operation.
4
  With some creative editing and distribution to the media, 
the duo‘s video spread like wildfire, implicating the organization as a 
willing accomplice to criminal activity.
5
  In the wake of public furor, 
Congress passed legislation wholly denying federal funding to the group.
6
  
Financially incapacitated, the organization sought any means to recover its 
lost funding.  It brought suit against the United States through an oddly 
                                                          
 1. See ACORN Workers Caught on Tape Allegedly Advising on Prostitution, CNN 
POLITICS (Sept. 11, 2009, 10:21 AM),  
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/10/acorn.prostitution/ (summarizing the events of 
a sting operation against a fair housing public interest organization, the Association of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now, also known as ACORN).  The events described 
here, leading to the congressional ban on appropriations to ACORN, are discussed in greater 
detail in Part III, infra. 
 2. See id. (detailing James O‘Keefe‘s solicitation of ACORN‘s Baltimore office ―for 
advice on how to set up a prostitution ring involving more than a dozen underage girls from 
El Salvador‖).  
 3. See id. (noting that both ACORN staffers ―appear[ed] enthusiastic to help‖ by 
encouraging the supposed prostitute to ―refer to herself as a ‗performing artist‘ on tax 
forms‖ and also noting that the sting was caught on tape). 
 4. See id. (describing the alleged prostitute and pimp as conservative activists and 
exploring previous, unsuccessful attempts at filmed sting operations). 
 5. See id. (elaborating on the allegations of assisting the supposed pimp and prostitute 
with ―setting up a prostitution ring and evading the IRS‖). 
 6. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, § 163, 123 
Stat. 2023, 2053 (2009) (prohibiting any federal funding from being appropriated to 
ACORN and its affiliates). 
  
effective, yet unobvious constitutional provision:  the Bill of Attainder 
Clause.
7
  
The Bill of Attainder Clause is arguably one of the most rarely-litigated 
constitutional clauses in our legal history.
8
  Born out of a desire to prohibit 
brash punishment of Loyalist sympathizers in the aftermath of the 
Revolution, the Clause has since taken on several transformations in the 
brief appearances it has made over the last two centuries.
9
  In the past few 
decades, it has served as a restraint of last resort on the actions of Congress; 
now, it is poised to constrain the seemingly unlimited ―power of the 
purse‖—the congressional appropriations power.10 
However, it remains uncertain as to whether the Bill of Attainder Clause, 
often perceived as a relic of history, can constitutionally restrain the power 
to appropriate, one of the most sacrosanct powers solely possessed by 
Congress.
11
  In one of the few instances where the Bill of Attainder Clause 
was successfully litigated, the Supreme Court seemed to say that such 
constraint was lawful.
12
  But in light of the divergent interpretations of the 
Clause and the growing number of judicial observations affirming 
legislative supremacy in the field of appropriations, the answer may not be 
so clear-cut. 
This Comment argues that the Bill of Attainder Clause can almost never 
serve to constrain Congress‘ targeted and specified withdrawal of 
appropriations to an organization.  Part I of the Comment discusses the 
history of the Bill of Attainder Clause and the Appropriations Clause, and 
                                                          
 7. See generally ACORN v. United States (ACORN I), 662 F. Supp. 2d 285, 299–300 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (enjoining the United States from enforcing the appropriations ban against 
ACORN on the grounds that it violated the Bill of Attainder Clause), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 8. See, e.g., R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 105 (R.I. 1995) 
(observing ―that the bill of attainder clause is rarely used to invalidate legislation‖); see 
generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (preventing the federal government from passing bills 
of attainder). 
 9. See discussion infra Part I.B (examining the history of the Bill of Attainder Clause 
and its subsequent legal evolutions). 
 10. See ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (invalidating the legislated blocking of 
federal funding for one identified organization via the Bill of Attainder Clause).  The 
prohibition against bills of attainder is also imposed on the states through the Contracts 
Clause; any potential restraint that the Bill of Attainder Clause poses on Congress‘ ability to 
appropriate also has implications for state legislatures.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 
(―No state shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . .‖); see also Fraternal Order of Police 
Hobart Lodge No. 121, Inc. v. City of Hobart, 864 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing 
that ―no legislature, state or federal, may pass a bill of attainder‖ under the Constitution).  
However, for purposes of simplified discussion, this Comment will assume state-based 
legislative appropriations and congressional appropriations are alike; any variation in the 
dichotomy between the federal and state systems is outside the scope of this Comment.   
 11. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7 (stating that ―no money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury‖ without an appropriation made by law). 
 12. See generally United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946) (striking down part 
of an appropriations bill on the grounds that it violated the Bill of Attainder Clause).  
  
summarizes the status of both clauses in federal jurisprudence today.  Part 
II describes the political and legal background to the litigation that brought 
forward an attainder challenge to the withdrawal of congressional 
appropriations.  Part III applies the Bill of Attainder Clause to the 
congressional appropriations power, using both the current test and an 
alternative one, and gauges the validity of conceptual rationales for the Bill 
of Attainder Clause in light of congressional appropriations.  As 
constitutional interpretation often yields differing viewpoints, alternative 
analyses of the Bill of Attainder Clause are also addressed.  In light of the 
overextension and inefficacy of the current attainder analysis, this 
Comment concludes by calling for a return to the strict, narrow 
interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in an effort to avoid a 
constitutional conflict with Congress‘ supreme appropriations power. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Tool of Convenience:  The British Legacy of Bills of Attainder 
Bills of attainder were legislative devices that originated from the late-
Medieval era English Parliaments.
13
  In modern parlance, a bill of attainder 
is legislation that targets individuals or easily ascertained members of a 
group, and inflicts upon them a designated punishment without the 
protections of a judicial trial.
14
  The date of passage of the first bill of 
attainder is unclear,
15
 but throughout the Tudor and Stuart dynasties, bills 
of attainder were popular in nullifying the political opposition.
16
  The reach 
of Parliament‘s taint ran far and wide; clergy protesting royal extravagance, 
traitorous soldiers, and the wives of Henry VIII all fell victim to legislative 
declarations of guilt.
17
  The ―tainting‖ associated with attainder was from 
the ―corruption of . . . blood‖ that would arise from a declaration of guilt 
and treason.
18
  As a result, the estates of the attainted dead were escheated 
                                                          
 13. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 847 
(1984) (describing the practice of passing bills of attainder as an ancient one, originating 
from the English Parliament); see also Raoul Berger, Bills of Attainder:  A Study of 
Amendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355, 374 & n.130 (1978) (debating whether 
the exclusion of tainted male issue in a certain case during the late 1390s Parliament 
constituted a bill of attainder). 
 14. Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722 (1951) (citing Lovett, 328 U.S. at 
315).  
 15. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 68 (1999). 
 16. Jane Welsh, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause:  An Unqualified Guarantee of 
Process, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 83 & n.18 (1983). 
 17. LEVY, supra note 15, at 69. 
 18. Charles H. Wilson, Jr., Comment, The Supreme Court’s Bill of Attainder Doctrine:  
A Need for Clarification, 54 CAL. L. REV. 212, 213–14 (1966).  The corruption of blood 
meant that the heirs of the attainted dead ―could not inherit and no one could inherit from 
him.‖  Id. (citation omitted).  In short, ―the attainted was wiped out as if he had never been 
born.‖  Id. at 214 (citation omitted).    
  
back to the respective Lord or to the Crown.
19
  Instead of dealing with the 
lengthy formalities of a trial, both Parliament and the King had a 
convenient method of dealing with the political enemies of the Crown and 
country:  a legislative declaration of guilt could simply be enacted to 
dispense with the protections and procedures of law.
20
 
Parliament also passed bills of ―pains and penalties.‖21  Such bills 
differed from bills of attainder in that they did not confer the highest 
penalty of death, but rather substituted banishment, seizure of property, 
imprisonment, or some other form of ―lower‖ punishment for political 
treason not quite worthy of death.
22
  Bills of pains and penalties also carried 
a potentially lethal ―taint‖—for instance, a person who aided a guilty party 
in escaping legislatively imposed imprisonment or evading the authorities 
would be found guilty of a felony, and both the imprisoned party and the 
aider would be put to death for defying Parliament‘s prescribed 
punishment.
23
 
Both bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties shared four 
common characteristics:  first, an accused identified by name; second, 
Parliament‘s justifications for according punishment to that party; third, a 
declaration of guilt, oftentimes contrary to common law and made for a 
special purpose; and fourth, a prescription of punishment.
24
  The fourth 
factor made the difference as to whether a bill was one of attainder or one 
―merely‖ of pains and penalties.25 
B. Prohibiting Legislative Punishment:  The Beginning of an American 
Constitutional Tradition 
English colonial settlers brought bills of attainder and bills of pains and 
penalties with them to the New World, but use of such bills was rare until 
the American Revolution.  The rebelling colonies and their early state 
successors would use bills of attainder to escheat the property of those 
loyal to the Crown back to the state government.
26
  But after the 
Revolution, with the inflamed passions of the war dying down, the use of 
                                                          
 19. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *252 (explaining that the ―feudal 
covenant and mutual bond of fealty‖ are broken when one is guilty of legal attainder).   
 20. Wilson, supra note 18, at 214. 
 21. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *256.  
 22. Wilson, supra note 18, at 214. 
 23. Bills of Attainder, 1 W. JURIST 73, 79 (1867).  In addition, fleeing from 
imprisonment or failing to surrender after committing a felony would be ―taintable‖ 
offenses, referred to as a ―conditional attainder.‖  Berger, supra note 13, at 374–75. 
 24. Bills of Attainder, supra note 23, at 81; Wilson, supra note 18, at 214. 
 25. See Berger, supra note 13, at 357 (describing the ―inseparable indicia‖ of a bill of 
attainder as crime, death, and corruption of blood and arguing that to have a ―milder degree 
of punishment‖ would lower a bill of attainder to a bill of pains and penalties). 
 26. LEVY, supra note 15, at 71. 
  
bills of attainder fell ―rapidly into disrepute,‖ eventually giving birth to the 
federal Bill of Attainder Clause.
27
  It was evident the Founding Fathers 
recognized that, had they lost the war, they would have been subject to the 
wrath of a parliamentary declaration of treason.
28
 
Between the Constitutional Convention and the Civil War, the Bill of 
Attainder Clause rarely had the chance to be litigated.  In one early 
interpretation of the Clause, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged, in dicta, 
that bills of attainder could come in many forms, with the power to ―affect 
the life of an individual . . . confiscate his property . . . or . . . do both.‖29  
The Chief Justice was absolute in his condemnation of such legislative 
abuse, proclaiming ―[i]n this form, the power of the legislature over the 
lives and fortunes of individuals is expressly restrained.‖30  The revulsion 
that he expressed towards legislative interference with judicial functions 
echoed prominently in the expansive interpretations of the Bill of Attainder 
Clause to come.
31
  
1. Crafting the expanse:  the first modern, functionalist interpretation of 
the  Bill of Attainder Clause 
Almost prophetic in its dormancy, it was not until the Civil War that the 
Bill of Attainder Clause made its most significant impact.  An uptick of 
loyalty oaths, prompted by concerns over lingering Confederate sentiments 
in a fractured Union, brought the first cases to shape the discourse of the 
prohibition against attainder to the Supreme Court.
32
 
The first modern attainder cases involved an odd pairing of groups:  the 
Roman Catholic Church and the remnants of the Confederate States of 
America.  In Cummings v. Missouri,
33
 a Roman Catholic priest was jailed 
                                                          
 27. Welsh, supra note 16, at 89.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (proscribing 
the passage of bills of attainder by Congress).  From this point onward, any reference to 
―bills of attainder,‖ unless otherwise noted, will refer to both bills of attainder and bills of 
pains and penalties. 
 28. See Welsh, supra note 16, at 84 (suggesting the possibility that ―the Framers of the 
American Constitution must have been extremely sensitive to the likelihood that they could 
have been the targets of a Parliamentary bill of attainder had America lost its war for 
independence‖); see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1344, at 217 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co. 5th ed. 
1994) (1891) (explaining the English use of bills of attainder during times of rebellion). 
 29. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137–38 (1810). 
 30. Id. at 138. 
 31. E.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 446 (1965) (using the Fletcher rationale 
to strike down legislation on the grounds that the Framers intended to limit Congress to the 
―task of rule-making‖). 
 32. E.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 332 (1866) (striking down a 
state-mandated, anti-Confederate loyalty oath required to become a priest); Ex parte 
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 (1866) (prohibiting the use of an anti-Confederate 
loyalty oath in swearing in lawyers). 
 33. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). 
  
and fined for refusing to take an oath to state and country.
34
  Postbellum 
Missouri determined that those who failed to take a loyalty oath could not 
―be competent, as a bishop, priest, deacon, minister, elder, or other 
clergyman, of any religious persuasion, sect, or denomination, to teach, or 
preach, or solemnize marriages.‖35  Missouri couched its test oath as a 
legitimate qualification of office:  a determination of ―fitness or 
capacity . . . for a particular pursuit or profession‖ within the purview of the 
state‘s police power.36  A similar, congressionally-imposed loyalty oath 
arose in Ex parte Garland
37
 where an attorney was barred from the practice 
of law for not first swearing under oath that he had not been an officer in 
the Confederate government.
38
 
Both cases were considered together, and both resulted in declarations of 
legislative attainder by a divided Supreme Court.
39
  Justice Field, writing 
for the majority in both cases, railed against the use of the legislative power 
to unduly punish individuals for a legislative perception of past 
disloyalty.
40
  In Cummings, the Court rejected the notion that bills of 
attainder, as a matter of law, had to constitute a deprivation of ―life, liberty, 
or property, and that to take from [an individual] anything less than these is 
no punishment at all.‖41  Justice Field wrote, ―[t]he Constitution deals with 
substance, not shadows.  Its inhibition was levelled at the thing, not the 
name.‖42  To the majority, punishment based on the perception of guilt, not 
the determination of guilt by the judiciary, was ―repugnant to the true 
genius of the common law.‖43   
Justice Miller, joined by Chief Justice Chase and two other justices, 
disagreed.
44
  The dissenters emphasized a need to respect the congressional 
mandate; they perceived that the right to practice law, much like any other 
profession, was a right granted by congressional grace, subject to the 
                                                          
 34. Id. at 316. 
 35. Id. at 317. 
 36. Id. at 319. 
 37. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). 
 38. Id. at 376–77. 
 39. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 332 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that 
Ex parte Garland ―involved principles of a character similar to those discussed in 
[Cummings,]‖ thus relying on the Ex parte Garland dissent to protest the majority‘s opinion 
in Cummings). 
 40. See id. at 322 (majority opinion) (―It was against the excited action of the States . . . 
that the framers of the Federal Constitution intended to guard.‖). 
 41. Id. at 320. 
 42. Id. at 325. 
 43. Id. at 331.  This language was borrowed from Alexander Hamilton‘s ―A Second 
Letter from Phocion.‖  See id. at 330 (noting that the repugnant nature of an oath under the 
Bill of Attainder Clause was written about by Alexander Hamilton). 
 44. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 382 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting).  Ex 
parte Garland served as the consolidated dissent for both cases.  See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) at 332 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (relying on the dissent in Ex parte Garland to serve 
as the Cummings dissent). 
  
whims of the legislative will.
45
  Justice Miller‘s dissent advocated for a 
traditionalist view of bills of attainder; with very little American 
jurisprudence to go by, he turned to England‘s laws of attainder and found 
little comparison between the loyalty oaths and laws capable of tainting an 
individual.
46
  The unconstitutional nature of a legislative act, according to 
Justice Miller, ―should be so clear as to leave little reason for doubt.‖47  The 
dissent‘s proposed test for attainder required three primary factors, none of 
which were present in the respective oath requirements:  first, a legislative 
usurpation of the judicial role in determining convictions and sentences; 
second, the lack of any previous law to inflict the sentence and punishment; 
and third, an investigation into the guilt of the accused without the presence 
of the accused or his counsel.
48
  Lacking these central elements, a vocal 
minority on the Court maintained that the loyalty oath requirements were 
indeed not bills of attainder.
49
 
About eighty years passed before the Supreme Court next had a major 
opportunity to revisit the Bill of Attainder Clause.
50
  The case arose in 
another post-war period filled with suspicion of potential traitors to the 
United States:  the Cold War.  In United States v. Lovett,
51
 three federal 
employees had their salaries stripped by Congress through the Urgent 
Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943,
52
 on belief that ―‗subversives‘ were 
occupying influential positions in the Government and elsewhere and that 
their influence must not remain unchallenged.‖53  The Act mandated, in 
pertinent part, that ―[n]o part of any appropriation contained in this Act 
shall be used to pay the salary or wages of any person who advocates, or 
who is a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the 
Government of the United States by force or violence . . . .‖54  Section 304 
of the Act proceeded to identify Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Jr., 
and Robert Morss Lovett as three individuals who were explicitly 
forbidden from benefitting from the appropriations act.
55
  Short of 
receiving juror pay or pay from service in the armed forces, the three were 
                                                          
 45. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 384–85. 
 46. See id. at 385–90 (observing that, in light of the British tradition of bills of 
attainder, a statute without a criminal designation of punishment and lacking an infliction of 
punishment could ―in no sense be called a bill of attainder‖). 
 47. Id. at 382. 
 48. Id. at 388. 
 49. Id. at 389–90. 
 50. See Welsh, supra note 16, at 93 (describing the evolution of the Bill of Attainder 
Clause post-Cummings and the corresponding passage of time).  
 51. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
 52. Pub. L. No. 78-132, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943). 
 53. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308. 
 54. § 301, 57 Stat. at 449. 
 55. Id. § 304, at 450. 
  
forbidden from receiving salary, refund, or reimbursement from the public 
treasury.
56
 
Section 304 was the product of fierce advocacy from the Chairman and 
one of the founding members of the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, Representative Martin Dies, Jr.
57
  On February 1, 1943, 
Congressman Dies launched into a diatribe on the House floor, naming 
thirty-nine federal government employees as ―‗irresponsible, 
unrepresentative, crackpot, radical bureaucrats‘ and affiliates of 
‗communist front organizations.‘‖58  He urged Congress to strip funding for 
these individuals‘ salaries.59  Congress was divided as to how to respond; 
some Members wanted to accept Representative Dies‘ accusations as fact; 
others wanted to avoid the appearance of a ―star chamber‖ approach to 
declaring guilt.
60
  A committee inquiry subsequently took place; the 
congressional committee compelled testimony from several witnesses (and 
the deliberate exclusion of others), and found Lovett, Watson, and Dodd to 
be ―guilty of having engaged in ‗subversive activity within the definition 
adopted by the Committee.‘‖61  
Deeming section 304 unconstitutional, the Court strongly admonished 
the legislation as ―the punishment of named individuals without a judicial 
trial.‖62  The fact that Congress investigated the three individuals, deemed 
them guilty of ―engaging in ‗subversive activities,‘ defined that term for the 
first time, and sentenced them to perpetual exclusion from any government 
employment‖ made section 304 a classic legislative infliction of 
punishment that was prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause.
63
  The 
Court then proceeded to declare section 304 unconstitutional, and 
effectively permitted Lovett, Watson, and Dodd to receive their rightful 
pay.
64
  More importantly, the Court reaffirmed the earlier notions that the 
definition of punishment was expansive, and punishment could be 
legislated in many different forms. 
                                                          
 56. Id.  
 57. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308 (examining the legislative history leading up to the 
passage of section 163).  See generally Dies, Martin, Jr., (1900 – 1972), BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 
 http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000338 (last visited Jan. 16, 
2011) (explaining Martin Dies‘ committee involvement in the House of Representatives, 
including with the Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities).  
 58. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308–09. 
 59. Id. at 309. 
 60. See id. at 309–10 (exploring the legislative history behind section 304 and general 
congressional sentiment to the Dies accusations).   
 61. Id. at 311.  
 62. Id. at 316. 
 63. Id. at 316. 
 64. Id. at 318. 
  
2. True, faithful, and narrow:  Justice Frankfurter and the literalist 
 approach 
While the Court‘s attainder analysis in Lovett was fairly brief and 
straightforward, it was Justice Felix Frankfurter‘s concurring opinion that 
sparked a divergence in the Court‘s discourse on the subject.  Justice 
Frankfurter agreed that the three individuals were owed their salary for 
their contributions to the federal government, but viewed the legislative ban 
and termination of funds as a breach of contract, not a constitutional 
violation.
65
  Thus, section 304 merely served to impede the fulfillment of a 
contractual obligation between employer and employee, and was not 
legislative punishment as posited by the majority of the Court.
66
 
Justice Frankfurter was absolutely loathe to broach the constitutional 
issue.
67
  He viewed the Bill of Attainder Clause as a specific provision 
designed to prohibit a ―very special, narrowly restricted, intervention by the 
legislature, in matters for which a decent regard for men‘s interests 
indicated a judicial trial.‖68  The Bill of Attainder Clause, Justice 
Frankfurter argued, was a historical relic—a constitutionalized break from 
the English tradition of prescribing the judicial functions to the 
legislature.
69
  An elemental approach to an attainder analysis was 
necessary; without the specification of an offense and person,
70
 declaration 
of guilt,
71
 or punishment for a past offense,
72
 a legislative act could not be 
deemed a bill of attainder.  Short of the narrow circumstances where these 
conditions were met, Justice Frankfurter believed that other constitutional 
                                                          
 65. See id. at 330 (―I feel compelled to construe § 304 as did Mr. Chief Justice Whaley 
below whereby it merely prevented the ordinary disbursal of money to pay respondents‘ 
salaries.‖) (internal citations omitted). 
 66. See id. (―[Section 304] did not cut off the obligation of the Government to pay for 
services rendered . . . .‖).  
 67. See id. at 319 (explaining Frankfurter‘s desire to ―prevent a collision between 
Congress and Court‖).  
 68. Id. at 322.  Frankfurter was not the first to espouse this view of the Bill of Attainder 
Clause; since the post-Civil War era, there had been some belief that the Bill of Attainder 
Clause had ―an established and technical signification long before the framing and adoption 
of the Constitution of the United States, and was well understood by the men who framed 
that instrument,‖ thus requiring all interpretations to be bound by the historical approach.  
Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 430–31 (1868) (Mason, J., dissenting).  
 69. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 322 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (calling for a literal, 
originalist view of the Bill of Attainder Clause).  In emphasizing the literalist approach, 
Frankfurter refers to Timothy Farrar‘s Manual of the Constitution of the United States of 
America, which notes that the concept of the bill of attainder, as discussed above, was 
imported from England; see id. (internal citations omitted). Presumably, Frankfurter was 
thinking of Britain‘s long-standing model of powers, in which the supreme judicial 
functions were carried out by the House of Lords.  See id. 
 70. See id. at 322–23. 
 71. See id. at 323. 
 72. See id. at 324 (connecting the prohibition against bills of attainder to the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the Constitution, in that there must be punishment for a past offense and a 
true bill of attainder would double up as both a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law). 
  
provisions, such as the Due Process Clause, more appropriately served to 
protect the rights of those who could not meet his rigid standards as to 
punishment with respect to the Bill of Attainder Clause.
73
 
Justice Frankfurter‘s literal, originalist approach to the Bill of Attainder 
Clause gained prominence throughout the Cold War era.  In American 
Communications Ass’n v. Douds,74 the Court held that a statute requiring 
labor unions to sign affidavits affirming that its officers were not members 
of the Communist Party did not constitute a bill of attainder.
75
  Chief 
Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, emphasized that a bill must punish a 
person for past actions; congressional action to prevent future conduct, 
however likely and predictable that such conduct would take place, did not 
make a bill of attainder.
76
 
It was not until 1961 that Justice Frankfurter had an opportunity to fully 
elaborate his narrow view of the Bill of Attainder Clause.  In Communist 
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
77
 Justice Frankfurter 
synthesized his controversial interpretation of the Bill of Attainder 
Clause.
78
  Speaking for a divided Court,
79
 he relied on the elemental 
approach he first set out in his Lovett concurrence.
80
  The statute in 
question, which required all ―Communist-action organization[s]‖ to register 
with the Attorney General (with criminal penalties for failing to do so),
81
 
was missing the key element of specificity; that is, no person or 
organization had specifically been named by Congress for registration.
82
  
Moreover, Justice Frankfurter expressed his strong distaste for judicial 
                                                          
 73. See id. at 321–22 (dividing constitutional claims into two types—one involving the 
broad standards of fairness, such as the due process clause, and the other being a ―very 
specific‖ type of constitutional provision, such as the prohibition of bills of attainder). 
 74. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
 75. See id. at 413–14 (establishing that past conduct can serve as ―substantial ground‖ 
for congressional judgment with respect to ―what the future conduct is likely to be‖). 
 76. See id. at 414 (deeming that Congress‘ purpose with the legislation was to ―forestall 
future dangerous acts,‖ thus foreclosing the notion that the statute was a bill of attainder).  
 77. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
 78. The controversy over which definition of attainder to accept arose in one of the next 
cases to appear before the Court, United States v. Brown.  The Brown Court explicitly 
rejected the ―narrow[] [and] technical‖ definition of attainder that Justice Frankfurter had 
espoused.  See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).   
 79. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart voted in the majority; 
Chief Justice Warren, as well as Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan were in the minority.  
Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 1.    
 80. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 8, 11 (describing the provisions of the 
Subversive Activities Control Act and listing the criminal sanctions for failing to comply).  
 82. See id. at 86 (asserting that the specificity requirement requires a designation of 
particular persons).  But see id. at 145–47 (Black, J., dissenting) (condemning the singling 
out of one party and deeming such legislation as a Bill of Attainder and a due process 
violation). 
  
intervention; to him, legislative acts commanded the highest deference
83
 
and demanded the clearest proof of unconstitutionality.
84
  Despite a clear 
legislative history and intent revealing that the bill was intentionally 
targeted to eliminate the Communist Party,
85
 the Court respected Congress‘ 
abidance by its constitutional power and safeguards, and ingrained a 
limited interpretation of the Clause in the nation‘s jurisprudence.86 
3. The swinging pendulum:  the uncertain present-day status quo 
It may be tempting to conclude that Douds and Communist Party clearly 
broke from Lovett and relegated the Bill of Attainder Clause to nothing 
more than a historical relic.  But the Court‘s position was far from clear; 
while there were two obvious perspectives on the matter, neither had a 
lasting majority on the Court, making the future of the Clause quite 
uncertain.
87
 
This was evidenced by the reappearance of the more expansive, 
functionalist approach to the Clause in United States v. Brown.
88
  In 1959, 
Congress passed a statute that made it a crime for a member of the 
Communist Party to serve in the leadership of a labor union.
89
  In striking 
down the statute as a bill of attainder, the Court fired back at the waning 
Frankfurter rationale.
90
  It declared, ―[t]he best available evidence, the 
writings of the architects of our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill 
of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore 
soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the 
                                                          
 83. See id. at 86 (majority opinion) (yielding to the legislature ―[s]o long as Congress 
acts in pursuance of its constitutional power‖ (citations omitted)).  
 84. Id. at 83 (―Of course, ‗only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the 
unconstitutionality of a statute on [Bill of Attainder grounds].‘‖ (quoting Flemming v. 
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960))).  
 85. See id. at 84 (establishing that the legislation was passed with the objective of 
―expos[ing] the Communist movement and protect[ing] the public against innocent and 
unwitting collaboration with it‖ (quoting S. Rep. No. 81-2369, at 4 (1950)).  
 86. See id. at 86–88 (listing the requirements for a statute to be deemed a bill of 
attainder and finding that the law in question did not ―offend[] the constitutional prohibition 
of attainder‖). 
 87. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 18, at 212–13 (describing the ―abrupt and emphatic 
departure‖ that United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), caused from the ―narrow and 
technical attainder doctrine developed in the 1950‘s‖). 
 88. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
 89. Id. at 439 n.1 (citing Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 
Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 504, 73 Stat. 519, 537 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 504 
(2006)). 
 90. By this time, Justice Frankfurter had passed away; Justice Arthur Goldberg, who 
succeeded Frankfurter on the Court, voted with the majority.  See, e.g., id. at 437.  Justices 
White, Clark, Harlan, and Stewart maintained Frankfurter‘s mantle of judicial restraint, 
dissenting from the majority opinion and condemning the Court‘s ―discard[ing] [of the] 
meticulous multifold analysis that has been deemed necessary in the past.‖  Id. at 463 
(White, J., dissenting).  So long as a rational basis for Congress‘ desire to prevent future 
conduct existed, the dissenters argued, and the means were reasonable, the legislation could 
not constitute a bill of attainder.  See id. at 478. 
  
separation of powers.‖91  Congress‘ failure to use ―rules of general 
applicability,‖ and its imposition of a criminal prohibition specifically 
targeting the Communist Party, satisfactorily constituted a bill of attainder 
for the Court.
92
 
Despite the need to resolve the extant vacillation between the broad 
functionalist approach and the narrow originalist interpretation, the two 
major cases decided since Brown have not shed much additional light.  In 
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
93
 the Court dealt with the 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,
94
 which 
specifically mandated that President Nixon surrender his personal 
presidential papers to the Administrator of General Services (and 
consequently, the National Archives).
95
  The Court, while recognizing that 
the anti-Frankfurterian approach in Brown and Lovett ―unquestionably gave 
broad and generous meaning to the constitutional protection against bills of 
attainder,‖ nevertheless relied on the more elemental approach to the 
attainder doctrine, citing the lack of punitive intent and punishment on the 
part of Congress as reason not to declare the act a bill of attainder.
96
 
The Nixon Court was instrumental in solidifying the importance of 
punishment in determining whether a particular law constituted a bill of 
attainder.  The Bill of Attainder Clause, the Court noted, was 
―anchor[ed] . . . to realistic conceptions of classification and punishment.‖97  
Nevertheless, as specificity and classification alone ―[did] not 
automatically offend the Bill of Attainder Clause,‖ the ―starting point‖ of 
any attainder inquiry was whether ―a form of punishment [had been] 
leveled against [an individual].‖98  The Court proceeded to dissect the 
concept of ―punishment‖ under the Bill of Attainder Clause into three 
interrelated tests.  One category of punishment existed if it ―[fell] within 
the historical meaning of legislative punishment.‖99  Alternatively, 
punishment could also exist if a law imposed severe burdens without 
legitimate legislative purposes.
100
  Finally, punishment could also be 
                                                          
 91. Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 (majority opinion). 
 92. See id. at 461–62 (proscribing Congress from passing legislation specifying the 
people upon whom a sanction would be levied).  
 93. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 94. Pub. L. No. 93-526, § 101, 88 Stat. 1695, 1695 (1974). 
 95. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 433–34 (citing § 101, 88 Stat. at 1695) (describing the 
provisions within the Act that transferred lawful possession of the Nixon recordings and 
files to the Administrator of General Services). 
 96. See id. at 469, 474–75 (elaborating on the history of bills of attainder and noting 
that President Nixon could not ―claim to have suffered any of these forbidden deprivations 
at the hands of Congress‖ simply by being forced to relinquish his personal papers). 
 97. Id. at 470. 
 98. Id. at 471–73.   
 99. Id. at 475. 
 100. See id. at 475–76.   
  
present if a burden was imposed with a ―legislative record [that] evince[d] 
a congressional intent to punish.‖101  Failing to discern any of these criteria, 
the Court rejected President Nixon‘s claim that the Act constituted a bill of 
attainder.
102
 
Disapproving of the majority‘s rationale, the Nixon dissenters further 
muddied the opaque understanding of the Bill of Attainder Clause.  To 
Chief Justice Burger, only two elements were necessary:  first, a specific 
designation of a person or a group; and second, an arbitrary deprivation 
akin to the deprivation of employment (or property rights in general) as 
seen in Cummings and Garland.
103
  Presidential papers, Chief Justice 
Burger argued, constituted property, and the deprivation of such property 
went to the heart of the prohibited punishment enshrined in the Bill of 
Attainder Clause.
104
 
Nixon, however, failed to resolve the lingering question as to whether a 
strict, Frankfurterian interpretation of the Clause was appropriate, or 
whether an expansive, functionalist approach was warranted; instead, the 
Court combined both the historical test and the functional test into one 
amalgamated analysis.
105
  Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public 
Research Group,
106
 also did little to clear the air.  The case involved the 
Military Selective Service Act,
107
 which required male citizens between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-six to register with the Selective Service, the 
agency responsible for enacting a military draft should it be deemed 
necessary.
108
  Failure to do so led to the imposition of criminal penalties, as 
well as preventing males that fell within this age range from qualifying for 
federal financial aid.
109
  The Court declined to accept the attainder 
challenge, primarily on the grounds that the Act lacked specificity as to a 
single identifiable group:  it applied to all qualifying male non-registrants, 
                                                          
 101. See id. at 478. 
 102. See id. at 484. 
 103. See id. at 538–39 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 104. See id. at 539–40 (explaining that ―our constitutional tradition‖ has been to treat 
Presidential papers as the personal property of the President, thus subject to the Bill of 
Attainder Clause as a deprivation of property, and subsequently examining the history of 
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 105. See id. at 473–84 (majority opinion) (establishing the factors for analyzing a bill of 
attainder claim). 
 106. 468 U.S. 841 (1984). 
 107. The enforcement provisions of the Military Selective Service Act were the 
provisions actually at issue.  See Selective Serv.  Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 
468 U.S. 841, 844 (1984) (describing Congress‘ enactment of the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act of 1983); see also Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983, 
Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1113, 96 Stat. 718, 748 (1982) (creating enforcement provisions for 
the Military Selective Service Act by tying federal aid to draft registration for eligible 
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 108. Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 843–45. 
 109. Id. at 843–44.  As it is commonly known, males outside this age range and women, 
as well as select others, were exempted from the requirement.  Id. at 844 n.2.  
  
an application too broad for what the Bill of Attainder Clause demanded.
110
  
In addition, no matter how severe the denial of federal student financial aid 
may have been,
111
 it did not constitute punishment in the historical sense, 
and accomplished legitimate nonpunitive legislative goals of pursuing 
compliance with the draft.
112
  Moreover, the legislative history strongly 
supported the notion that nonpunitive goals were furthered, foreclosing the 
legitimacy of the attainder-based arguments.
113
  Thus, the enforcement 
provisions of the Act were deemed not to be a bill of attainder.
114
  
However, while the Selective Service Court may have rejected the specific 
attainder-based arguments presented, it rearticulated and reinforced a 
somewhat well-defined test in deciphering what exactly constitutes a bill of 
attainder,
115
 which resulted in the present state of the issue today. 
C. Birth of the Public Fisc:  Origins of the Appropriations Power 
The legislative power to appropriate was seen even before the medieval 
parliamentary acts of attainder, originating in the Magna Carta, which 
decreed that ―[n]o scutage nor aid shall be imposed on [the English] 
kingdom, unless by common counsel of [the] kingdom.‖116  This effectively 
transformed into Parliament‘s limitations on the power of the King to raise 
revenue and injected Parliament into the fiscal decision-making process.
117
  
Gradually, with the evolution of the English common law, Parliament was 
recognized to have ―possessed an indisputable sovereignty‖ in the matters 
of lawmaking, taxation, and appropriation.
118
  Some English jurists went as 
                                                          
 110. See id. at 847 n.3 (dismissing the notion that the denial of Title IV aid constituted 
punishment). 
 111. See id. at 851 (recognizing ―that the severity of a sanction is not determinative of its 
character as punishment‖).  
 112. Id. at 854 (citing 128 Cong. Rec. 9666 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Jepsen)) (noting 
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 114. Id. at 856. 
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 116. Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign 
Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1217 (2009) (quoting WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, 
MAGNA CARTA:  A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 232 (2d ed. 1914)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 117. Id. at 1217. 
 118. Id. at 1225 (quoting DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1845, at 10–12 (9th ed. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  
far as to believe that the right to appropriate was an absolute one, solely 
vested in ―the faith of Parliament.‖119 
The notion of the legislature‘s supreme rule over the appropriations 
process migrated across the Atlantic to the English New World.  Colonial 
governments conducted their limited public financing schemes under the 
purview (and often abuse) of the colonial legislatures.
120
  After the 
American Revolution and by the time of the Constitutional Convention, it 
became clear that ―the right of appropriation could [not] be [properly] 
exercised by any branch other than the legislature.‖121  This was by no 
means an accident; many of the Framers, including Madison, recognized 
that ―the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the 
people.‖122  In the final iteration of the Constitution, legislative supremacy 
over the so-called ―power of the purse‖ was enshrined in the 
Appropriations Clause.
123
 
Over the last two centuries, federal jurisprudence on the Appropriations 
Clause validated this idea.  In the nineteenth century, the Court of Claims 
in Hart’s Case124 explicitly held that ―[t]he absolute control of the moneys 
of the United States is in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its 
exercise of this great power only to the people.‖125  The Supreme Court 
voiced its opinion later that century, noting that claims and debts for 
Congress to satisfy through appropriations ―depend[ed] solely upon 
congress, and whether it will recognize claims thus founded must be left to 
the discretion of that body.‖126 
Despite the Court‘s holding in Lovett, there is an implied recognition of 
Congress‘ supremacy and discretion to appropriate within the framework of 
the Bill of Attainder Clause.  In Flemming v. Nestor,
127
 the Social Security 
Administration terminated the benefits of the respondent, Ephram Nestor, 
                                                          
 119. Id. at 1237 (quoting Macbeath v. Haldimand, (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1036, (K.B.) 
1038; 1 T.R. 172, 176). 
 120. See DONALD R. STABILE, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE:  DEBATES 
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 125. Id. at 484. 
 126. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440–41 (1896) (emphasis added). 
 127. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). 
  
on the grounds of his deportation, which in turn was based on his alleged 
membership in the Communist Party during the 1930s.
128
  The Court 
rejected the district court‘s finding that the deprivation of social security 
benefits, which the Court described as ―a form of social insurance, enacted 
pursuant to Congress‘ power to spend money in aid of the general welfare,‖ 
constituted the deprivation of property akin to the punishment forbidden by 
the Bill of Attainder Clause.
129
   
The Court went further in dismissing the respondent‘s attainder-based 
arguments, noting that ―the clearest proof‖ was required to make such an 
assertion of unconstitutionality; such was not present in Nestor‘s case.130  
Moreover, the sanction was ―the mere denial of a noncontractual 
governmental benefit,‖ hardly without a rational basis and far from 
reaching the scope of penalties traditionally considered punishment, such 
as imprisonment.
131
  Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, stressed the 
importance of the long-standing deference to Congress in matters of 
appropriations, positing that ―[w]hether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the 
scheme of benefits . . . is not for us to say.  The answer to such inquiries 
must come from Congress, not the courts.‖132  To do otherwise would 
require judicial assessment of Congressional motives, which the Flemming 
Court deemed ―a hazardous matter.‖133  The Flemming decision exhibited 
the Court‘s hesitance to intrude into an endeavor that was constitutionally 
prescribed to Congress alone. 
The clearest affirmation of Congress‘ supremacy in the field of 
appropriations did not appear until the 1990s.  In Office of Personnel 
Management v. Richmond,
134
 the Court made it quite clear that ―[m]oney 
may be paid out only through an appropriation made by law; in other 
words, the payment of money from the Treasury must be authorized by a 
statute.‖135  The majority placed heavy emphasis on deferring to Congress 
in the context of fiscal appropriations.
136
  The ―fundamental and 
comprehensive purpose‖ of such deference was to ―assure that public funds 
will be spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by 
Congress as to the common good and not according to the individual favor 
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of Government agents or the individual pleas of litigants.‖137  In sum, the 
Court determined it would be antithetical to the Constitution to allow 
anyone other than Congress to determine who should benefit from the 
public fisc.  After Richmond, subsequent decisions by the circuit courts of 
appeal followed suit in ardently affirming Congressional supremacy over 
the appropriations power.
138
 
II. SETTING THE STAGE:  THE ACORN CRISIS 
On July 24, 2009, two aspiring conservative activists, James O‘Keefe 
and Hannah Giles, walked into the Baltimore office of the Association of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now, a public interest group 
commonly referred to as ACORN.
139
  Armed with a hidden video camera, 
O‘Keefe and Giles were set on entrapping the ACORN office in an 
undercover sting operation, designed to elicit cooperation with apparent 
criminal activity.
140
  O‘Keefe presented himself to the ACORN staff as an 
aspiring lawyer and politician, and described Giles as being in a ―unique 
business‖—prostitution.141  In a conversation filled with subtle undertones, 
O‘Keefe and Giles communicated to the Baltimore ACORN staff that they 
sought to purchase a home so that Giles could run her own prostitution 
ring.
142
  The duo furthered the appearance of criminality by proposing that 
child prostitutes from El Salvador would be utilized in this prostitution 
ring.
143
  From the undercover footage, the Baltimore ACORN staff seemed 
not only to condone the pair‘s feigned planning of criminal activities, but 
seemed willing to be complicit in them.
144
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The video was released on a conservative pundit‘s website and was 
followed up with similar office visits to Washington D.C., Brooklyn, New 
York, San Bernardino, and San Diego.
145
  Once the videos were released, 
ACORN was subjected to public outrage and furor over its employees‘ 
willingness to facilitate the trafficking of underage girls for the sex trade.
146
  
President Obama, who held ―infrequent ties‖ to the organization, jumped 
into the fray by noting that the conduct of ACORN employees as displayed 
on O‘Keefe‘s videos ―deserv[ed] to be investigated.‖147 
Congress decided to take it a step further.  A myriad of bills were 
introduced by Republican leaders to completely strip ACORN of its 
funding.
148
  However, instead of an independent bill, a funding ban against 
ACORN was incorporated into a continuing legislative appropriations 
resolution.
149
  Congress voted 345 to 75 to defund the organization.
150
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edited).   
 146. See Chris McGreal, Congress Cuts Funding to Embattled Anti-Poverty Group 
ACORN, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Sept. 21, 2009, 16.38 BST), 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/21/acorn-prostitution-videos (describing the 
shock embraced by ―many Americans‖ over the ACORN workers‘ willingness to discuss 
―the trafficking of girls for sex work‖).  
 147. Dan Eggen, President:  ACORN Videos ‘Inappropriate’, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002313.html.  
 148. See, e.g., Defund ACORN Act, H.R. 3571, 111th Cong. (2009); Protect Taxpayers 
from ACORN Act, S. 1687, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 149. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, § 163, 123 
Stat. 2023, 2053 (2009) (outlining ―appropriation[s] for the Legislative Branch for the fiscal 
year ending September 30, 2010,‖ including the prohibition of funds from being ―made 
available . . . to the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), 
or any of its affiliates, subsidiaries, or allied organizations‖). 
 150. Darryl Fears & Carol D. Leonnig, The $1,300 Mission to Fell ACORN, WASH. 
POST. (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
  
A. Breaking New Ground:  The District Court’s Decision 
Not willing to let the legislation go unchallenged, ACORN filed suit to 
enjoin the federal government from complying with the legislation.
151
  
ACORN relied on the Bill of Attainder Clause to challenge section 163 of 
the Continuing Resolution, which was interpreted by the Office of 
Management and Budget to mean that ―[n]o agency or department should 
obligate or award any Federal funds to ACORN or any of its affiliates.‖152  
Such a singling out, ACORN argued, made the legislation a bill of 
attainder, with the prohibition serving as punishment for the political 
scandal surrounding the group.
153
 
The trial court agreed with this assessment.  In enjoining the federal 
government from carrying out section 163, the trial court made five 
principal observations.  First, Lovett was ―particularly instructive‖ as a 
starting point because it dealt with an appropriations bill that had a punitive 
effect prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause.
154
  Second, there was no 
valid, non-punitive purpose for Congress to enact legislation depriving 
ACORN of funding.
155
  Third, less burdensome alternatives were available 
to ensure that any legitimate objectives, even if they existed, could be 
accomplished without a total appropriations ban.
156
  Fourth, based on the 
legislative history, Congress determined ACORN‘s guilt before defunding 
it.
157
  Finally, even if Congress intended to deter future criminal conduct by 
using the public fisc, its act still constituted punishment; the goal of 
deterring future acts, the court reasoned, was still a traditional rationale for 
judicial punishment.
158
  With this assessment in tow, the district court 
                                                          
dyn/content/article/2009/09/17/AR2009091704805.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST200909170
4852.   
 151. See generally ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d 285, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining that 
ACORN filed a suit against the United States challenging the Continuing Appropriations 
Resolution as an unconstitutional bill of attainder) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 618 F.3d 
125 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 152. Id. at 289 (quoting an ―OMB Memorandum‖ issued by Director Peter Orzag 
(citations omitted)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 292. 
 155. See id. at 293 (explaining that the Government‘s reference to Flemming and 
Selective Service to show the nonpunitive nature of its actions against ACORN was 
inapposite because Flemming lacked a legislative record of purely punitive intent, and 
Selective Service ―had the valid goal of encouraging a class of persons to . . . register for the 
draft‖). 
 156. See id. at 295 (citing Congress‘ failure to rely on ―available mechanisms for 
investigation‖ through various federal agencies). 
 157. See id. at 294 (―[T]he nature of the bar and the context within which it occurred 
make it unmistakable that Congress determined ACORN‘s guilt before defunding it.‖) 
 158. See id. (rejecting the government‘s argument that the deterrence of future 
misconduct was not a punitive aim under the Bill of Attainder Clause, and emphasizing that 
the deterrence of future conduct ―is a traditional justification of punishment‖).  
  
enjoined the United States from enforcing the congressionally-mandated 
funding ban.
159
 
B. An Appealing Appeal:  The Second Circuit’s Restoration of the 
ACORN Funding Ban 
In the aftermath of the district court‘s ruling, the United States filed an 
appeal with the Second Circuit,
160
 and the lower court‘s decision was 
stayed.
161
  In an opinion released less than a year after the trial court‘s 
injunction was issued, the Second Circuit, with Judge Miner writing for a 
unanimous panel, vacated the trial court‘s invocation of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause.
162
  In examining whether the withdrawal of 
appropriations was within the scope of coverage of the Clause, the court, 
using the post-Nixon/Selective Service test for punishment, evaluated the 
historical punishment, functional punishment, and legislative 
history/motivational prongs of the current attainder test.
163
 
The court easily observed that the withdrawal of appropriations could 
not constitute punishment as defined historically, failing the first part of the 
three-pronged punishment test.
164
  Lacking ―imprisonment, banishment, 
[and] death,‖ the continuing resolution could not be a bill of attainder as 
classically defined.
165
  The court went further to dispel any correlation 
between historical bills of attainder and the ―taint‖ and stigma suffered by 
ACORN; such an effect of alienation was inconsequential in light of 
Congress‘ ―authority to suspend federal funds to an organization that has 
admitted to significant mismanagement.‖166 
                                                          
 159. See id. at 299–300 (issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining Executive Branch 
officials). 
 160. Brief for Appellants, ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 
09-5172-cv, 10-992-cv), 2010 WL 3214690. 
 161. Emergency Stay, ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-
5172-cv, 10-992-cv), available at  
http://republicans.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/SecondCircuitOrderGrantingStay.pdf.  
 162. ACORN v. United States (ACORN II), 618 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 163. Id. at 136.   
 164. See ACORN II, 618 F.3d at 137 (holding that the withdrawal of appropriations 
―does not constitute a traditional form of punishment‖). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. (acknowledging that the appropriations ban may have caused some stigma 
but rejecting the notion that Congress‘ exercise of its spending power was ―so 
disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpunitive ends as to invalidate the 
resulting legislation as a bill of attainder‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Sabri v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004); Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473 
(1977))).  Interestingly enough, while most of the Second Circuit‘s opinion concentrates on 
Congress‘ appropriations power, the court bases some of its discussion on the related 
Spending Clause.  Nevertheless, for purposes of expressing the supremacy of Congress‘ 
appropriations power, any difference between the Spending Clause and the Appropriations 
Clause is inapposite.  Compare Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605 (establishing that ―Congress has 
authority under the Spending Clause . . . to promote the general welfare, . . . and it has 
corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . to see to it that taxpayer 
  
Next, the court turned to ACORN‘s arguments on functional 
punishment.  There were three central arguments which ACORN made and 
the court refuted in this regard:  first, Congress‘ specific naming of 
ACORN as a party to be excluded from federal funding was in itself 
functional punishment;
167
 second, to target the unnamed affiliates of 
ACORN would be functionally punishing those allied organizations;
168
 and 
third, the bypassing of administrative procedures in imposing the funding 
ban indicated functional punishment.
169
   
In fairly efficient form, the court dismantled each argument in turn.  The 
court first rejected the idea that specificity alone could make the 
withholding of appropriations an action of attainder.
170
  Congress, the court 
reasoned, ―may single out an entity or person in its legislation.‖171  In 
addition, the court observed, the targeting of unnamed allies and affiliates 
of ACORN had the effect of hurting ACORN‘s case; leaving such groups 
unnamed left room for federal agencies to determine who fell under the 
appropriative ban, similar to a rule of general applicability permitted under 
the Bill of Attainder Clause.
172
  Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the 
notion that the circumvention of administrative procedures made the 
appropriations ban punitive; the court, in light of the special nature of 
congressional appropriations, declined to view such circumvention as 
indicative of prohibited punishment.
173
   
Observing that the congressional ban was neither historical nor 
functional punishment, the court turned to the final prong of legislative 
history and punitive motivation to determine whether the legislation could 
be deemed a bill of attainder.
174
  The panel acknowledged that several 
statements made by Members of Congress accusing ACORN of criminal 
conduct could be potentially reflective of a legislative intent to punish, but 
                                                          
dollars . . . are . . . not frittered away in graft . . . .‖), with Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. 
Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427 (1990) (explaining that Congress‘ appropriations power 
―constitutes a most useful and salutary check upon . . . corrupt influence and public 
peculation‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting STORY, supra note 28, § 1348)). 
 167. ACORN II, 618 F.3d at 139. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 139–40.  This argument is founded upon a jurisdiction-specific observation 
made by the Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 
2002), where the court found that a law that bypassed administrative procedures to impose a 
burden upon an entity would suggest that such legislation was imposing functional 
punishment.  Id. at 349.  ACORN also made a fourth argument with respect to functional 
punishment, premised on the notion that a favorable GAO investigation would not resolve 
the funding ban.  ACORN II, 618 F.3d at 139–40.  This argument was summarily dismissed 
by the court.  Id. 
 170. ACORN II, 618 F.3d at 139. 
 171. Id. at 138 (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469–72). 
 172. Id. at 139. 
 173. Id. at 140. 
 174. Id. at 141. 
  
declared that without a congressional finding of guilt,
175
 usually of the type 
that follows a legislative trial,
176
 the ban against ACORN and its affiliates 
could not be perceived as motivated by an unlawful punitive intent.
177
 
Meeting none of the criteria required by what the Second Circuit 
interpreted to be the post-Nixon bill of attainder test, the trial court‘s 
injunction was vacated, and ACORN‘s funding ban was restored.178  
III. ANALYSIS 
ACORN presents the deceptively basic, yet truly complex, issue of 
whether congressional defunding of a private organization constitutes a bill 
of attainder—the answer to which has been described as ―generally elusive 
and perhaps even illusory.‖179  Before analyzing whether the Bill of 
Attainder Clause can be used to restrain the appropriations power of 
Congress, we must first decipher the current landscape of the attainder 
doctrine.  There are two separate components that are essential in 
understanding the Bill of Attainder Clause‘s interplay with the 
Appropriations Clause; the Bill of Attainder Clause must be understood in 
its application, and it must also be understood as a concept.  
In terms of its application, as described in Part I, the Court has relied on 
two radically different interpretations of the Bill of Attainder Clause:  the 
narrow, literalist, Frankfurterian approach, which focuses on the original 
intent with respect to the prohibition against bills of attainder;
180
 and the 
broad, functionalist, anti-Frankfurterian approach, where the notion of 
                                                          
 175. Id. at 142. 
 176. But see id. (explaining that legislative trials do not consist of the only mechanism to 
establish the high level of proof needed for unconstitutional punitive intent to be reflected in 
the legislative record). 
 177. See id. (dismissing the statements made by legislators accusing ACORN of criminal 
activity as insufficient to meet the threshold required by the Bill of Attainder Clause); see 
also id. at 141 (declaring that a ―smattering‖ of statements by legislators ―do not constitute 
[the required] unmistakable evidence of punitive intent‖ (alteration in original) (quoting 
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 846 n.15 (1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  To buttress the notion that ACORN‘s mismanagement was at 
the center of the appropriations ban, the court relied on an independent report commissioned 
by ACORN named the ―Harshbarger Report,‖ which covered ACORN‘s mismanagement 
leading up to and including the prostitution scandal.  See id. at  
130–31. 
 178. Id. at 142. 
 179. Eugene Volokh, District Court Preliminarily Enjoins ACORN Defunding Law as a 
Bill of Attainder, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 11, 2009, 9:38 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2009/12/11/district-court-preliminarily-enjoins-acorn-defunding-law-as-
a-bill-of-attainder/. 
 180. See generally Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 
(1961) (rejecting a Communist registration requirement as a bill of attainder for lack of 
specificity); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 329–30 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (advocating for a strict interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause as defined 
by history). 
  
punishment is open to wider interpretation.
181
  In addition, the Clause itself 
has been justified by two different conceptual perspectives:  as an 
enshrinement of the separation of powers,
182
 and as an early guarantee of 
due process.
183
 
When a matter of legislative appropriations is viewed in light of the Bill 
of Attainder Clause, much is revealed about both its conceptual limitations 
and the proper mode of interpretation.  First, the scenarios presented by 
ACORN and other similar situations demonstrate that the functionalist 
approach is unworkable, at least when viewing something as 
constitutionally sacrosanct as the Appropriations Clause.
184
  Second, the 
interplay between attainder and appropriations suggests that certain 
conceptual views of the Bill of Attainder Clause, such as the notion that it 
reinforces the separation of powers or that it is a guarantee of due process, 
fail to advocate for the functionalist approach.
185
  Finally, the analysis 
shows that only the originalist, Frankfurterian interpretation can conform to 
the expectations of the Constitution.
186
   
A. Of Funding and Punishment:  The Failure of the Broad, Functionalist 
Interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause 
Despite the muddled history and interpretation of the Bill of Attainder 
Clause, its gradual constitutional evolution has led to a test that evaluates 
three primary factors to determine whether a legislative act truly constitutes 
the prohibited punishment (aside from an obvious specificity 
requirement).
187
  First, the bill may constitute ―historical attainder‖:  the 
imprisonment, banishment, and punitive confiscation of property 
                                                          
 181. See generally Brown v. United States, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965) (permitting the 
notion of punishment to include the prohibition of Communist Party members from being 
union leaders); Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316 (widening the scope of the attainder laws to 
encompass punishment via denial of appropriative funding); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 277, 324–25 (1866) (broadening the notion of punishment to include the 
deprivation of employment from a priest); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 
(1866) (extending the punitive aspect of the Bill of Attainder Clause to include prohibiting 
former Confederate officers from serving as attorneys). 
 182. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (describing the Bill of Attainder Clause as a 
means of prohibiting legislative assumption of the ―judicial magistracy‖). 
 183. See generally Welsh, supra note 16, at 110–11 (advocating for the Bill of Attainder 
Clause to function as a due process guarantee where a typical Fifth Amendment or 
Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection claim would fail).  
 184. See discussion infra Part III.A (analyzing an appropriations ban through the current 
attainder test and observing its ambiguity and inefficacy).  
 185. See discussion infra Part III.B, III.C (arguing that the separation of powers rationale 
supports an abandonment of the current bill of attainder test and noting that the traditional 
due process concerns do not apply to matters of legislative appropriations, respectively). 
 186. See discussion infra Part III.D (advocating for the adoption of a narrowed, literalist 
interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause to avoid constitutional conflicts). 
 187. See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
  
historically accorded to attainted individuals.
188
  Second, the bill may also 
contain ―functional‖ punishment; that is, if it serves to burden or deprive an 
individual in a manner inconsistent with the Bill of Attainder guarantee, 
then it may be deemed unconstitutional.
189
  Part of determining whether a 
bill constitutes ―functional‖ punishment is determining whether it 
reasonably serves to further nonpunitive goals.
190
  If it does not, then it is 
easier to make a finding of functional punishment.
191
  Finally, the 
legislative history of an act may also support a finding of attainder; if a 
clear and unambiguous showing of punitive intent is shown on the part of 
the legislature, then a law may properly be deemed a bill of attainder.
192
 
On its surface and as a general rule of legal application, the law on bills 
of attainder seems relatively straightforward.  If there is either historically 
recognized or modern, functional punishment, combined with a clear and 
unambiguous showing of punitive intent, then the law is constitutionally 
prohibited.
193
  But in fact, this approach is an awkward amalgam 
encompassing both the literal, Frankfurterian school of thought and the 
expansive, anti-Frankfurterian doctrine.  It incorporates Frankfurter‘s belief 
that the Bill of Attainder Clause is a ―very special‖ type of provision, 
designed to be constrained by history, but also gives rise to a more flexible, 
functional approach to defining ―punishment,‖ as seen in Brown.194 
The constitutional conflict inherent in attempting to control the 
appropriations power using the Bill of Attainder Clause is shown in a 
                                                          
 188. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 474 (1977) (describing the 
means of punishment as understood historically). 
 189. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 851 
(1984) (noting that the inquiry as to punishment does not stop at a historical analysis of 
punishment; a functional analysis must also be included). 
 190. See id. at 853–54 (explaining the role of legislative purpose as part of the calculus 
of punishment). 
 191. See id. (describing the nonpunitive goals of the selective service requirement as 
expressed through legislative history in holding that it did not constitute functional 
punishment). 
 192. See, e.g., Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478 (highlighting that the third test of punishment is ―a 
motivational one:  inquiring whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to 
punish‖); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (establishing that the 
―clearest proof‖ is required to strike down a law as a Bill of Attainder). 
 193. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473–78 (listing the three prongs of the attainder/punishment 
analysis and describing the role of the third prong of motivational punishment). 
 194. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321–22 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (describing the Bill of Attainder Clause as ―very special,‖ and limited to a 
specific set of narrow circumstances as intended, where the legislature usurps the traditional 
judicial function).  A strong argument can be made that Lovett, Garland, and Cummings 
constituted punishment in the traditional sense, as there are arguments to be made with 
respect to deprivation of property.  Although the means by which such deprivations took 
place were uncommon and not necessarily thought of as judicial—such as the appropriations 
act in Lovett or the loyalty oaths in Garland and Cummings—the net effect was an 
occupational deprivation, something that can constitute a deprivation of livelihood and 
property.   
  
straightforward, post-Nixon and Selective Service analysis.  As understood 
historically, it seems clear that when Congress bars an organization from 
being funded, it constitutes neither attainder nor a bill of pains and 
penalties; the only conceivable argument that could be made is that the 
withdrawal of appropriations constitutes a punitive confiscation of 
property.
195
  The denial of appropriations, however, does not constitute the 
taking of property because Congress is not imposing a fine or other 
monetary penalty; rather, Congress is prohibiting further access to the 
public coffers, denying a benefit it had previously bestowed.
196
  As the 
Parliamentary history of both bills of attainder and bills of appropriation 
demonstrates, the two have wholly separate origins, and the denial of a 
right to funding can hardly be considered ―historical‖ punishment.197 
But under the more nebulous, ―functional punishment‖ assessment, one 
is more quickly inclined to believe that the deprivation of appropriation 
could constitute a bill of attainder.  After all, in accordance with Justice 
Field‘s idea that the Constitution deals with ―substance, not shadows,‖ any 
form of legislative contrivance could conceivably be a bill of attainder, so 
long as there is a specific target and the net effect of the legislation imposes 
a burden on an individual.
198
  In fact, the legislative device at issue in 
Lovett was an appropriations bill that resulted in unlawful punishment 
through the prohibition of funding, as seen in ACORN.
199
  Presumably, 
                                                          
 195. See, e.g., Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474 (defining the traditional historical array of 
punishment as including execution, imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive 
confiscation of property (internal citations omitted)). 
 196. Compare Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, § 163, 
123 Stat. 2023, 2053 (2009) (prohibiting any federal funding from being directed to 
ACORN and its affiliates), with Memorandum from the Cong. Research Serv. to the House 
Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?CRDC-ID=CRS-2009-CRS-0002 (showing a 
congressionally-directed allocation of $140,000 to the New York ACORN program for 
Juvenile Justice Programs through the Department of Justice). 
 197. See Bills of Attainder, supra note 23, at 79–81 (describing the typical reasons for a 
Parliamentary bill of attainder or a bill of pains and penalties, as well as the procedure in 
which such bills are passed); Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 1217–25 (explaining 
the British origins of the appropriations power, from the Magna Carta to post-Revolutionary 
England); see also LEVY, supra note 15, at 71 (establishing the history of the American 
colonial use of bills of attainder, prior to the constitutionally-imposed ban). 
 198. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866) (condemning 
the postbellum loyalty oaths for their specificity in presuming the guilt of priests and 
clergymen and resulting deprivation of rights by ―legislative enactment‖). 
 199. Compare Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-132, § 304, 
57 Stat. 431, 450 (―No part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund . . . shall be used . . . to 
pay any part of the salary, or other compensation for the personal services, of Goodwin B. 
Watson, William E. Dodd, Junior, and Robert Morss Lovett  
. . . .‖), with Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010 § 163 (―None of the funds made 
available by this joint resolution or any prior Act may be provided to the Association of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now . . . or any of its affiliates, subsidiaries, or allied 
organizations.‖). 
  
under this approach, any legislative deprivation could be sufficient to 
constitute a bill of attainder so long as the specificity element is met.
200
 
Compounding the problem is that every act of congressional 
appropriations comes with the inherent assumption that the legislature is 
acting on behalf of the general welfare of the country.
201
  This goes to the 
nonpunitive intent aspect of the functional punishment analysis; if 
appropriations bills are drafted in a manner that is based on 
constitutionally-vested congressional judgments, then, according to the 
functional punishment rationale, legislation concerning appropriations 
could almost never constitute a bill of attainder as there will always be a 
nonpunitive rationale present.
202
  The presumption can only be rebutted in 
cases where the punitive intent for appropriations is overwhelming.
203
  This 
underlying presumption of acting in the general welfare is especially salient 
                                                          
 200. See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification:  A Suggested Approach to 
the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (1962) [hereinafter Ely] (noting that 
some cases have established that any deprivation can amount to punishment).  While the 
aforementioned student comment is unsigned, the amici brief of a group of constitutional 
law professors to the ACORN appeal notes that Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law 
School confirmed Professor John Hart Ely‘s role in authoring the work as a student at Yale 
Law School.  See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8 & n.3, ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 
09-5172-cv (L), 10-992-cv (CON)) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae] (citing Alan M. 
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Underlying Theme of Alan Dershowitz’s Writing and Teaching, 71 ALB. L. REV. 731, 737 & 
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Ely‘s student unsigned comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification:  A Suggested 
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The Ely Comment is significant in that it lays the modern foundation for functionalist 
arguments that the Bill of Attainder Clause is to be broadly construed, with some arguing 
that the Brown Court relied on the Ely Comment to attack the strict, narrow interpretation of 
the Frankfurterian approach.  E.g., Berger, supra note 13, at 379–80 (arguing that the Brown 
Court‘s decision ―closely paraphrased [Ely‘s] position‖).   
In light of Ely‘s expansive view of punishment, courts have warned that such a view has 
the potential to unjustifiably constrict the powers of the legislature.  E.g., Long Island 
Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (warning that ―all modern 
legislation regulating the economic activities of specific groups might be considered 
‗punishments,‘‖ and additionally observing that ―the bill of attainder clause, if read too 
broadly, could be used to cripple the ability of legislatures to respond to some perceived 
social or economic problem‖). 
 201. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990) 
(describing the ―fundamental and comprehensive purpose‖ of the Appropriations Clause to 
ensure that ―public funds will be spent according to the . . . judgments reached by Congress 
as to the common good‖ (emphasis added)).  
 202. Cf. Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) (assuming that the 
determination as to ―whether [a] present expenditure serves a public purpose‖ has been 
made by the ―law-making department,‖ and as a result, the court will refuse to intervene 
unless there is ―a plain case of departure from every public purpose which could reasonably 
be conceived‖).  
 203. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 83 
(1961) (asserting that the ―clearest proof‖ is necessary to strike down a law as a bill of 
attainder, and in light of this, finding that the Communist registration requirements were not 
―so lacking in consonance as to suggest a clandestine purpose‖ of punishment). 
  
for corporations and organizations such as ACORN, who receive 
appropriations with the expectation that Congress has ―the power to control 
and direct the appropriations . . . [as] a most useful salutary check upon 
profusion and extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public 
peculation.‖204  If an attainder analysis demands that the ―clearest proof‖ of 
punitive intent be offered,
205
 then the underlying supposition that all 
appropriations acts are done for the sake of the public welfare, in both 
commission and prohibition, bars such clarity from being delivered. 
The final complexity arises from the third factor of the current attainder 
analysis:  a clear ―congressional intent to punish.‖206  Pegging the attainder 
analysis on the legislative history of a particular provision treads on 
dangerous terrain, especially for an appropriations bill. ―[T]o look for 
congressional intent is to engage in anthropomorphism—to search for 
something that cannot be found because it does not exist.‖207  Moreover, 
legislative history can contradict itself; by premising attainder analysis on 
it, judges can ―pick and choose those bits which support the result [they] 
want to reach.‖208 
Take, for example, the ACORN case.  At the very least, the contrast 
between the district court‘s decision and the reversal by the Second Circuit 
highlights the vast inconsistency in interpreting the legislative record.
209
  
The trial court cites several legislative accusations of criminality, most 
notably Congressman Darrell Issa‘s publication of a report entitled, ―Is 
ACORN Intentionally Structured as a Criminal Enterprise?‖210  In 
discussing ACORN, legislators ran the gamut on reasons to punish the 
organization,
211
 calling ACORN a facilitator of child prostitution,
212
 a 
racketeering organization,
213
 and a ―reprehensible enterprise‖ engaged in 
                                                          
 204. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 427 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1348 (3d ed. 1858)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 205. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960). 
 206. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 478–79 (1977). 
 207. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?,  
31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Compare ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d 285, 296–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the 
statements made by various Members of Congress ―underline[d] the punitive nature of the 
government‘s purportedly non-punitive reason‖), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 618 F.3d 125 
(2d Cir. 2010), with ACORN II, 618 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to find a 
punitive legislative intent despite the presence of the statements observed by the trial court 
because ―there is no congressional finding of guilt‖). 
 210. ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 296–97. 
 211. See Brief of Appellant at 34, ACORN v. United States, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Nos. 09-5172-cv (L), 10-992-cv (CON)) (summarizing floor statements made regarding the 
ACORN scandal). 
 212. 155 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Sep. 24, 2009) (statement of Rep. Bachman). 
 213. 155 CONG. REC. H9788 (daily ed. Sep. 22, 2009) (statement of Rep. Carter). 
  
illegal activity.
214
  But proponents of the funding prohibition also supported 
the bill out of a concern to ―defend taxpayers against waste, fraud, and 
abuse.‖215  Deciphering the intent of any legislation, much less an 
appropriations bill, can be a haphazard guess, making it practically 
impossible to determine whether a sufficiently clear indication of punitive 
intent exists.
216
  The Second Circuit correctly observed as much and, failing 
to see the clarity demanded by the attainder analysis to defeat the 
presumption of constitutionality,
217
 declined to find the legislative record 
sufficient to support a punitive intent.
218
  
In sum, applying the current bill of attainder test to a legislative act 
prohibiting appropriative funding for one specific group demonstrates the 
following.  First, the withdrawal of appropriations can never be deemed a 
―historical‖ punishment.219  Second, the broad understanding of what can 
constitute ―functional punishment‖ includes the prospect of an 
appropriations ban being punitive, but this notion is undercut by the fact 
that legislatures have a legitimate rationale for spending (or withholding) 
for the sake of the general welfare, thus having nonpunitive intent implied 
with every appropriation made or taken away.
220
  Third, the legislative 
history reveals at least some degree of conflict in terms of legislators‘ 
intent with respect to the prohibitive provision.
221
  In other words, the 
modern test leaves us in paradoxical terrain.
222
  While the ACORN trial 
court found that Congress legislated a bill of attainder through section 
                                                          
 214. 155 CONG. REC. H9555 (daily ed. Sep. 16, 2009) (statement of Rep. Bilirakis). 
 215. 155 CONG. REC. S9517 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2009) (statement of Senator Johanns).   
Indeed, the trial court cited this in its opinion, but misinterpreted it as a prohibited 
expression of a punitive legislative intent.  See ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 296.  As 
discussed below, in most instances, Congress may pass judgment on the misuse of federal 
funds and withdraw funding accordingly, without being questioned by judicial oversight. 
 216. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (expressing that judicial 
attempts to inquire into Congressional motives, beyond objective manifestations, make for 
―a dubious affair indeed‖).  
 217. See, e.g., id. 
 218. See ACORN II, 618 F.3d 125, 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (comparing the legislative record 
of ACORN to the secret trial held in Lovett and declaring that the ―smattering‖ of legislative 
statements rhetorically indicting ACORN of criminal activity was insufficient to establish 
―unmistakable evidence‖ of punitive intent). 
 219. See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 198–205 and accompanying text (questioning whether the 
deprivation of appropriations can constitute ―functional punishment‖ in light of an inherent, 
legitimate, nonpunitive purpose); see also Berger, supra note 13, at 358 (decrying the 
comparison between legislation passed with ―Congress‘ salutary purpose‖ in mind and bills 
of attainder as ―sanguinary hyperbole‖). 
 221. See supra notes 206–15 and accompanying text.  
 222. See Berger, supra note 13, at 358 (explaining that the expansive attainder test has 
―engendered confusion, particularly in the attempt to define what constitutes ‗punishment‘ 
for purposes of a bill of attainder‖ (internal citations omitted)). 
  
163,
223
 it just as easily could have interpreted the legislation another way, 
as the Second Circuit did in the ACORN appeal.
224
  As the separation of 
powers and due process rationales discussed below support, the current 
test, while comprehensive, is a poor amalgam for determining what truly 
constitutes a bill of attainder; a return to the narrow, originalist, 
Frankfurterian approach is necessary to reestablish constitutional 
tranquility.
225
 
1. Counterpoint:  weighing the arguments for the preservation of the 
 functionalist approach 
Several constitutional law scholars
226
 have strongly advocated for the 
preservation of the functional, rather than the adoption of the formalistic, 
approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause.
227
  Relying on the functionalist 
language provided in Cummings,
228
 Lovett,
229
 and Brown,
230
 the scholars 
conclude that an expansive analysis is necessary to ―look behind the literal 
terms of a statute in assessing the permissibility of the legislative 
regulation.‖231   
The scholars‘ major contention is premised on Brown and Lovett, in that 
the Bill of Attainder Clause bars the imposition of almost anything that 
                                                          
 223. ACORN I, 662 F. Supp. 2d 285, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 224. See generally ACORN II, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (declaring that Congress‘ 
appropriations ban against ACORN could not constitute a bill of attainder because it failed 
to meet the three-pronged test for legislation).  
 225. See generally United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 319 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (characterizing his interpretation as a means of ―prevent[ing] collision between 
Congress and Court‖). 
 226. These scholars include Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, along with Professors Bruce 
Ackerman, David D. Cole, Michael C. Dorf, Mark Graber, Seth F. Kreimer, Sanford V. 
Levinson, Burt Neuborne, and Stephen Vladeck.  Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 
1a–2a.  
 227. See id. at 1 (observing that the ―federal Bill of Attainder Clause ‗was intended not 
as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an 
implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against the legislative 
exercise of the judicial function‘‖ (quoting United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 2 
(1965))). 
 228. Id. at 9 (―The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows . . . .‖ (quoting 
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866))). 
 229. Id. (―[L]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named 
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict 
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the 
Constitution.‖ (alteration in brief) (emphasis added in brief) (quoting United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315–16 (1946))). 
 230. Id. at 10 (―[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was not to be given a narrow historical 
reading (which would exclude bills of pains and penalties), but was instead to be read in 
light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar:  legislative punishment, of any form or 
severity, of specifically designated persons or groups.‖ (quoting Brown, 381 U.S. at 447)).  
But see Berger, supra note 13, at 369 & n.99 (accusing Chief Justices Warren and Burger of 
inflating the dicta of Chief Justice Marshall‘s statement in Fletcher). 
 231. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 10. 
  
could remotely be perceived as punishment.
232
  It is entirely possible, 
however, that the scholars have read too much into the language of the 
functionalist cases.
233
  In referring to the many forms of punishment that 
can be presented, the Court has warned of the many creative legislative 
paths that could potentially impose a traditionally judicial punishment on 
an individual; this is, in fact, what the Bill of Attainder Clause guards 
against.
234
  An expansive approach to the attainder prohibition sought to 
prevent Congress from imposing fines, prison sentences, and other 
traditionally judicial deprivations through crafty legislative methods that 
imposed inconvenient, difficult, or impossible requirements on specific 
individuals.
235
  The language of the functionalist cases could potentially be 
aimed towards the problem of creative legislative drafting, and not 
necessarily the burden or the perceived punishment of a particular bill.
236
  
As discussed below, the separation of powers arguments accentuate the 
notion that the attainder analysis should be limited to instances where 
Congress metes out traditionally judicial punishments to single individuals, 
and the definition of ―punishment‖ should be constrained.237 
Assuming arguendo that the functionalist scholars (who served as amici 
to the ACORN appeal) are correct in advocating for the functionalist 
approach, there are still a number of unresolved issues.  For one, there is no 
demonstration as to how the deprivation of appropriations constitutes 
―punishment.‖  While scholars suggest that the ―denial of eligibility for a 
particular government benefit can constitute punishment within the 
                                                          
 232. Id. at 13 (explaining that ―Lovett . . . stands for the proposition . . . that 
‗punishment‘ in the context of bill of attainder analysis . . . [requires] simply the 
legislature‘s imposition of any kind of punishment (for past conduct or behavior) on 
specified persons‖). 
 233. In fact, it may be entirely possible that the attainder analysis presented by the 
scholars is incomplete, failing to take into consideration (or deliberately omitting) the other 
half of the attainder jurisprudence.  It is interesting to note that the scholars, serving as amici 
curiae in the ACORN appeal, do not cite a single literalist case in support of their argument. 
 234. Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 323–24 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (concluding that the Framers intended for the prohibition against bills of 
attainder to require the imposition of punishments typically found in historical bills of 
attainder, e.g. death, or bills of pains and penalties).   
 235. For example, section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 
at the center of Brown, barred Communists from serving in union leadership positions; 
violation was met by a rather traditional punishment of a short prison sentence and/or a fine 
of $10,000.  See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 438-39 (1965) (citing Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 504, 73 Stat. 
519, 536). 
 236. See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. at 447 (―[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was not meant to 
be given a narrow historical reading (which would exclude bills of pains and penalties), but 
was instead to be read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar:  legislative 
punishment, of any form or severity . . . .‖ (emphasis added)).   
But see Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322 (1866) (rejecting a narrowed 
interpretation limiting punishment to the deprivation of life, liberty, and property). 
 237. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
  
meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause,‖238 and cite the denial of 
employment benefits in Lovett to buttress their theory,
239
 Flemming seems 
more relevant and analogous, undercutting the functionalist rationale.
240
  
Although scholars emphasize the role that Congress played in depriving 
benefits over the actual nature of the benefits deprived in Lovett, it is 
critical to note that the Flemming Court condoned the deprivation of 
noncontractual governmental benefits as an appropriative matter beyond 
the ambit of traditional judicial punishment.
241
  Thus, the scholars‘ claim 
that Lovett and its progeny simply require ―the legislature‘s imposition of 
any kind of punishment (for past conduct and behavior)‖242 is tenuous, only 
ambiguously supported by the case law, and ignores the other 
Frankfurterian half of attainder jurisprudence.
243
   
B. Attainder Versus Appropriations:  A Murky Separation of Powers 
One of the primary conceptual rationales behind the Bill of Attainder 
Clause is that it serves as a guardian of the separation of powers, premised 
on the notion ―that no single body can alone effectuate the total policy of 
government.‖244  The Framers were concerned about the legislative power 
becoming too great and being tyrannically exercised over individuals in 
scenarios where the judiciary should be playing the primary role.
245
  To 
commentators such as the late Professor John Hart Ely, the Bill of 
Attainder Clause serves as the inverse, legislative analogue to the Article 
III cases and controversies requirement—a constitutional barrier preventing 
Congress from crossing over into the terrain of the judiciary.
246
 
                                                          
 238. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 12. 
 239. See id. (noting that the Lovett Court held the legislative barring of ―government 
funds to pay three specified government employees determined by the House to have 
engaged ‗subversive activity‘‖ constituted a prohibited bill of attainder (citing United States 
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313–17 (1946))). 
 240. Flemming dealt with the Social Security system and deemed the program an 
enactment ―pursuant to Congress‘ power to spend money in aid of the general welfare.‖  
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609 (1960) (citations omitted).  Arguably, directed 
congressional appropriations are a benefit similar to social security, enacted for the general 
welfare.  
 241. See id. at 617 (dismissing the sanction of social security benefits as ―the mere denial 
of a noncontractual governmental benefit‖). 
 242. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 13. 
 243. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 (assessing the denial of governmental benefits as a 
―mere denial‖ not within the scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause); see also Lovett, 328 
U.S. at 330 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that the blocking of federal funds for the 
employment of the plaintiffs was not punishment per se, but a contractual issue of pay). 
 244. Ely, supra note 200, at 343. 
 245. See id. at 344 (establishing the Framers‘ concerns over the ―dangers of the 
combined exercise of the legislative and adjudicatory functions‖).  
 246. See id. at 347 (explaining in detail how Article III prohibits encroachment on the 
rulemaking abilities of Article I, and how the Bill of Attainder Clause prevents 
encroachment into the specific application of law as typically prescribed by the judiciary). 
  
But the separation of powers argument falters when the Bill of Attainder 
Clause is injected into the appropriations process.  Appropriations, by their 
very nature, are legislated with specificity.
247
  Congress‘ power to 
appropriate is absolute;
248
 the executive answers to the conditions of the 
legislature and the judiciary is in no position to play the legislature‘s role, 
making the power to appropriate an anomalous one in the context of 
separation of powers concerns.
249
 
Moreover, as Ely notes, the Bill of Attainder Clause was meant to 
prohibit trials by legislature; the worries over legislative punishment are 
ancillary to the primary concerns of legislative usurpation.
250
  But as 
Richmond and other cases dealing with the Appropriations Clause suggest, 
Congress frequently undertakes legislative judgments with respect to the 
                                                          
 247. See, e.g., Earmarks, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 
 http://earmarks.omb.gov/earmarks-public/ (last updated Nov. 12, 2010) 
 (describing earmarks as ―funds provided by the Congress for projects, programs, or grants 
where purported congressional direction . . . specifies the location or recipient‖ (emphasis 
added)).  But cf. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET:  POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 217 (3d 
ed. 2007) (explaining that whereas traditionally, ―authorizing legislation rarely specified 
amounts authorized to be appropriated,‖ the current practice utilizes specific amounts of 
authorization).  Unsurprisingly, the first appropriations bill was much broader, using four 
lump sums to cover all of the government‘s expenditures:  ―$216,000 for the civil list, 
$137,000 for the War Department, $190,000 to discharge warrants issued by the previous 
Board of Treasury, and $96,000 for pensions to disabled veterans.‖  LOUIS FISHER, THE 
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS, 1789–1993, at 4 (2003) (citation omitted).  The Second 
Circuit recognized the significance of the special nature of appropriations in its decision.  
See ACORN II, 618 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that, while the bypassing of 
administrative procedures could conceivably support the notion that a particular piece of 
legislation is a bill of attainder, the ―inference is difficult to draw  
. . . when a congressional appropriations law is at issue‖). 
 248. See Hart‘s Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880) (―The absolute control of the moneys of 
the United States is in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great 
power only to the people.‖), aff’d, 118 U.S. 62 (1886).  But see New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (limiting Congress‘ ability to place conditions on spending for the 
States by requiring ―some relationship‖ between the conditions placed and ―the purpose of 
federal spending‖).  Arguably, the case is inapposite, as New York had Tenth Amendment 
implications not present in Congress‘ appropriations and spending powers vis-à-vis federal 
agencies and individual organizations; therefore, Congress‘ appropriations power remains 
supreme in the non-state regard.  See id. (raising concerns over federal funds influencing a 
State‘s legislative choices).  
 249. See Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945) 
(observing that the terms and conditions in which Congress makes appropriations ―is a 
matter solely in [its] hands,‖ compelling compliance by the executive branch and shielding 
appropriative acts from interference by the judiciary); cf. Ely, supra note 200, at 344 
(detailing the traditional concerns of an unrestrained legislature in light of a limited 
executive and judicial branch).  In fact, some, such as Raoul Berger, speculated that the 
Court‘s expansive ―transmutation‖ of the Bill of Attainder Clause ―invaded the 
policymaking functions of the state and federal legislatures.‖   
See Berger, supra note 13, at 356.  
 250. See Berger, supra note 13, at 402–03 (explaining that the purpose of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause was to preserve the separation of powers, and ―not to prevent legislative 
‗punishment,‘ but to prevent legislative trial‖ (quoting Ely, supra note 200, at 356) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
  
propriety of appropriations and their applicability to the general welfare.
251
  
It is not a ―trial‖ in the sense of the judicial term, but appropriations 
committees have the power to summon witnesses and receive testimony in 
a manner similar to that seen in judicial trials.
252
  Congress, as a matter of a 
constitutionally vested right,
253
 passes judgment over the worthiness of an 
appropriative endeavor and,
254
 exercising that judgment, similarly has the 
ability to prohibit funds from reaching certain entities.
255
 
Lovett, however, poses an interesting issue.  The case involves a 
legislative appropriations act that imposed a prohibition similar to the one 
in ACORN.
256
  To declare that Congress may prohibit ACORN‘s funding 
but is prohibited from effectively terminating the employment of 
potentially treasonous government employees yields two inconsistent 
outcomes in two similar scenarios.   
Two distinctions make the dichotomous reality possible.  The first 
distinction concerns the type of person targeted by the respective statutes—
the employees in Lovett were individuals, not corporations.
257
  It has been 
undeniable since the early Bill of Attainder Clause jurisprudence that 
individuals were intended to be protected from the exercise of what Story 
might have called the ―legislative magistracy.‖258  But the separation of 
powers analysis for attainder becomes confusing with the recognition of 
corporations as potential subjects of bills of attainder.
259
  As a matter of 
                                                          
 251. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990) 
(perceiving the ―fundamental and comprehensive purpose‖ of the Appropriations Clause as 
a means of assuring ―that public funds will be spent according to the letter of the difficult 
judgments reached by Congress as to the common good‖ (emphasis added)). 
 252. See generally H. COMM ON APPROPRIATIONS, 111TH CONG., COMMITTEE RULES 
(2009), available at 
http://appropriations.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=263&Ite
mid=34 (outlining the procedural privileges of committee members during appropriations 
hearings, including the summoning of witnesses and the submission of evidence). 
 253. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (articulating that ―[n]o money shall be 
drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law‖); Figley & 
Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 1239 (contending that ―the Appropriations Clause enshrined 
this legislative supremacy by vesting the ‗power of the purse‘ in Congress‖).   
 254. See, e.g., Carmichael v. S. Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) 
(explaining that the judgment as to ―whether the present expenditure serves a public purpose 
is a practical question addressed to the law-making department‖). 
 255. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 427.  In fact, the use of limitation language, as seen in 
section 163, is not uncommon in appropriations legislation.  See SCHICK, supra note 247, at 
268, 270 (contrasting the legitimate use of limitation language in appropriations laws under 
House Rule XXI and Senate Rule XVI with the prohibited insertion of substantive law). 
 256. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.  
 257. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 304 (1946). 
 258. Cf. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (establishing that ―[a] bill of 
attainder may affect the life of an individual‖ and that the legislature‘s power in that respect 
―over the lives and fortunes of individuals [was] expressly restrained‖ (emphasis added)). 
 259. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 346–47 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(declaring the Bill of Attainder Clause not to be just a personal, individual guarantee and 
permitting the Clause to be applied to corporations).  It is interesting to note that the Second 
  
political reality, individual employees such as the ones involved in Lovett 
do not have the practical ability or need to lobby Congress for 
appropriations funding; organizations such as ACORN do have such 
abilities and needs.
260
  Thus, federal government employees are far less 
likely to be subjected to the mercy and whims of the complex 
appropriations process, whereas an organization such as ACORN should be 
aware of the possibility of defunding. 
The second distinction hones in on the legislative process and net effect 
of the statutes.  In Lovett, the first step to defunding the employment of the 
three individuals was Congress generally deeming ―subversion‖ an activity 
worthy of terminating employment.
261
  Such a general rule, however ad hoc 
it may have been, was perfectly within Congress‘ ambit to generate.262  But 
the task of specifying who was subversive—a perceivably criminal 
classification—typically was expected of the judiciary; with criminal laws, 
the legislature is only permitted to proclaim the overarching rules for 
society.
263
  Instead, Congress usurped the judiciary‘s role by deeming 
Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Jr., and Robert M. Lovett as 
subversives and instituting the penalty of unemployment.
264
 
With ACORN, Congress did not legislate a new crime and pronounce 
ACORN to be guilty.
265
  Rather, in its general power of eliminating the 
corrupt use of appropriations,
266
 it made a deliberate decision to prohibit 
the use of federal funding.  It may have passed judgment to render its 
decision, and some of that may have entailed accusations of criminal 
activity, but these are judgments that Congress is permitted to make 
                                                          
Circuit understood the uncertainty of whether this determination was appropriate; aside 
from citing loose dicta from several Supreme Court decisions and the ―implied assumption‖ 
that the Clause would apply to corporations in other circuits, the Second Circuit had very 
little jurisprudential support.  See id. at 347 (―The applicability of the Bill of Attainder 
Clause to corporations remains unsettled in every circuit.‖). 
 260. Cf. Transmittal from the Congressional Research Service to the House Judiciary 
Committee (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://web.lexis- 
nexis.com/congcomp/attachment/a.pdf?_m=1bce2f7d9c8304140e1d07e1a72d0f92&wchp=
dGLbVlb-zSkSA&_md5=05f2f8c680d6e685525c364fd6ade6e1&ie=a.pdf (summarizing 
ACORN‘s activities in Congress to ―promote affordable housing and assist the homeless‖).  
 261. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316. 
 262. See, e.g., Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136 (establishing that ―[i]t is the peculiar 
province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society,‖ and to 
leave the application of the rules to ―other departments‖).  
 263. See id. 
 264. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316. 
 265. See Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, § 163, 123 
Stat. 2023, 2053 (2009) (preventing the disbursal of federal funds for ACORN).  The 
legislation did not contain any congressional findings of criminal guilt. 
 266. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427 (1990) (endorsing 
the full use of the appropriations power to check against ―corrupt influence and public 
peculation‖). 
  
without the usurpation of judicial authority.
267
  In fact, permitting the 
judiciary to control the appropriations process is a greater contravention of 
the separation of powers than an appropriations bill can be perceived as 
being invasive of the judicial power.
268
 
C. The Inapplicability of the Due Process Rationale 
The second conceptual rationale behind the Bill of Attainder Clause is 
that it serves as an early guarantee of due process.
269
  This notion is closely 
intertwined with the separation of powers rationale, but can be 
distinguished.  More specifically, the due process query is whether the 
courts ―need only ask if the manner in which the legislature is attempting to 
accomplish its purpose is proper.‖270  This goes to the heart of Justice 
Story‘s condemnation of the legislative usurpation of the ―judicial 
magistracy.‖271  Whereas the separation of powers rationale focuses on the 
usurpation itself as a matter of governmental structure, the due process 
argument focuses on the protections accorded to an individual.
272
 
The concept of the Bill of Attainder Clause as a due process guarantee 
only serves to further the notion that the Clause cannot serve to restrain the 
Congressional appropriations process in its full exercise, whether through 
the commission or prohibition of funding.  The prohibition against attainder 
can only extend to situations where ―the protections of a judicial trial‖ 
would be anticipated for an individual.
273
 
In the appropriations arena, no process needs to be accorded to private 
organizations; the discretion of deliberation and ―process‖ is solely vested 
in the hands of the legislature,
274
 and Congress can make either a 
                                                          
 267. Id. at 427–28 (noting that Congress‘ determinations regarding appropriations 
require ―difficult judgments‖). 
 268. See Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 116, at 1252 (explaining that there is ―no 
warrant‖ to believe that the judiciary ever had the power to compel an appropriation). 
 269. Cf. Welsh, supra note 16, at 102 (proposing that, as ―an absolute constitutional 
prohibition against trial by legislature,‖ the Bill of Attainder Clause is ―a guarantee of 
process‖ (citations omitted)).  
 270. Id. at 103–04. 
 271. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (describing bills of attainder as a 
pronunciation of guilt without ―any of the common forms and guards of trial‖).  
 272. Compare United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (viewing the Bill of 
Attainder Clause as ―an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard 
against legislative exercise of the judicial function‖), with BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 
58, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Bill of Attainder Clause 
ensured the preservation of ―the factfinding and due process protections of trial in an Article 
III court‖). 
 273. See Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977) (identifying the 
legislative determination of guilt and the infliction of punishment ―without provision of the 
protections of a judicial trial‖ as essential elements to make a bill of attainder (emphasis 
added)). 
 274. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 253 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(―[T]he legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some 
  
comprehensive inquiry or no inquiry at all as to whether an appropriation 
should be commissioned or prohibited.
275
  The Supreme Court has 
recognized as much and granted an almost-universal deference to Congress 
in making decisions on appropriations, especially as to who should receive 
them and for what purpose they should do so.
276
  As the Court in Richmond 
noted, it is for Congress to reach the ―difficult judgments . . . as to the 
common good,‖ and the appropriations process should not be left to ―the 
individual favor of Government agents or the individual pleas of 
litigants.‖277 
But much like the issues raised by Lovett with respect to the separation 
of powers rationale, it is unclear how the three employees in that particular 
case fell outside the appropriative realm, thereby justifying constitutional 
intervention by the due process rationale of the Bill of Attainder Clause.  
After all, it can easily be said that the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations 
Act of 1943 merely served to prohibit funds, used for the general welfare, 
from going to suspected subversive individuals.
278
   
The key in distinguishing Lovett from cases like ACORN is that 
individuals are not the immediate beneficiaries of Congressional 
appropriations
279
 and are not expected to be part of its process as 
recipients.
280
  In rescinding and placing conditions on appropriations, 
                                                          
constitutions full discretion . . . .‖); see also Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 
985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (observing that the judiciary is forbidden from interfering with 
―the exclusive powers of Congress‖ in appropriation matters and that the executive is 
compelled to comply with Congress‘ exercise of such powers). 
 275. Cf. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440–41 (1896) (explaining that 
Congress is the only branch of government where ―any application [of claims and debts 
may] be successfully made‖ and an entity‘s ―recognition depends solely upon congress, and 
whether it will recognize claims thus founded must be left to the discretion of that body‖ 
(emphasis added)). 
 276. See, e.g., Carmichael v. S. Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) (declaring 
inquiries as to ―whether [an] expenditure serves a public purpose [to be] a practical question 
addressed to the law-making department,‖ and requiring ―a plain case of departure from 
every public purpose . . . to justify the intervention of a court‖); see also John W. Brabner-
Smith, Judicial Limitations on Federal Appropriations, 25 VA. L. REV. 659, 661 (1939) 
(hypothesizing that the Court‘s intervention in matters of appropriations would ―suspend[]‖ 
and ―disorganize[]‖ the entire appropriations process). 
 277. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990). 
 278. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 306 (1946) (referring to the federal 
government‘s argument that the appropriations ban was a valid exercise of the ―general 
Welfare‖ phrase of the Appropriations Clause). 
 279. But see Priv. L. No. 100-38, §§ 1–2, 102 Stat. 4860, 4860–61 (1988) (granting sums 
to individuals totaling $101,622).  Even under such rare circumstances, Congress acts on its 
own volition to grant an individual an appropriation for the sake of remediating an error or 
wrong, not to grant an undeserved financial windfall.  See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 431 
(explaining that Private Law 100-38 was passed because the servicemen listed ―joined [the] 
wrong retirement plan in reliance on erroneous advice‖).    
 280. In theory, there is no explicit bar to individuals being the recipient of 
appropriations.  After all, the early American tradition ―was to adjudicate each individual 
money claim against the United States‖.  Richmond, 496 U.S. at 430.  However, there are 
several suggestions that such a prohibition is now in place.  First, with respect to the 
  
Congress cannot implicate actors who otherwise would not play any role in 
Congress‘ funding of the general welfare.  Further, the appropriations 
power in Lovett was used to prevent the three individuals from practicing 
their profession as employees of the United States government; this is a 
deprivation of a right to property—specifically, employment—that the 
Court has strongly recognized as one that is to be protected by judicial 
process.
281
  In contrast, when such liberties are not at stake, courts have 
been extremely hesitant to inject themselves into the process of 
congressional appropriations.
282
   
Through the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Framers intended to protect 
individuals from the capricious whims of legislatures wishing to impose a 
punishment that could only otherwise be accorded through a judicial 
trial.
283
  The Clause was not meant to inject judicial notions of due process 
into processes where a judicial trial would be constitutionally 
unwarranted.
284
   
Due process is only invoked through the Bill of Attainder Clause in 
cases where, absent laws involving the deprivation of life or liberty,
285
 
                                                          
Constitution, the related Spending Clause suggests that Congress must ―provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.‖  U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 
1. (emphasis added).  Second, case law seems to validate the notion that the Court will defer 
to Congress on spending matters, so long as the power is being used for the sake of the 
general welfare.  See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (delineating 
Congress‘ ―authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal moneys to promote 
the general welfare‖ (emphasis added)); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936) 
(agreeing with the Hamiltonian view that ―Congress . . . has a substantive power . . . to 
appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the 
general welfare of the United States‖ (emphasis added)).  Finally, practical considerations 
and a look to the current operation of the appropriations process seems to suggest that even 
within the scope of earmarking, the process promotes spending for organizational projects, 
not appropriations to individuals.  Cf. SCHICK, supra note 247, at 245, 247 (providing 
examples of home district projects requested through the earmarking process in a 2006 
appropriations bill and instructing earmark requesters to identify recipient organizations in 
their requests). 
 281. See generally Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (discussing the 
prohibition of employment as a priest without a loyalty oath as a bill of attainder and a 
deprivation of property in the form of employment); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 
333 (1866) (discussing the same in the context of employment as an attorney). 
 282. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (explaining that the 
inquiries to the ―wisdom or unwisdom‖ of a congressional scheme of benefits ―must come 
from Congress, not the courts‖); id. at 617 (warning that ―[j]udicial inquiries into 
Congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter‖). 
 283. See STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (illustrating occasions where the legislature 
would pass bills of attainder ―in times of rebellion . . . or [] violent political excitement‖ and 
in doing so, would be most vulnerable to ―trampl[ing] upon the rights and liberties of 
others‖). 
 284. Cf. Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that the Due Process Clause, working in 
conjunction with the Bill of Attainder Clause, does not give ―an unwarranted power of 
intrusion into local affairs‖ where a local government makes decisions of employment in 
part by inquiring about political affiliation). 
 285. Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473–74 (1977).  
  
Congress legislatively deprives an individual of his property
286—and by 
extension, his livelihood.
287
  In those instances, an individual should enjoy 
―the common forms and guards of trial‖ and be able to answer against the 
reasons motivating such deprivation in an environment where the 
―formality of proof‖ is required ―in the ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings.‖288  But the Constitution recognizes no role for the judiciary 
to play in the deliberation of appropriations;
289
 therefore, the protections 
that accompany a judicial trial are similarly inapplicable when Congress 
makes its appropriative decisions.
290
  It is hard to imagine that the 
deprivation of congressional appropriations, arguably a ―noncontractual 
government benefit,‖ can be deemed a deprivation of property barred by 
the Bill of Attainder Clause.
291
  Moreover, even if the protections of a trial 
were available to determine whether the withdrawal of appropriations was 
lawful, a court would be powerless to compel Congress to provide a 
remedy in re-appropriating funds.
292
  Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that 
the limited due process rationale behind the Bill of Attainder Clause reveals 
that the Clause was not meant to constrain the congressional appropriations 
power. 
1. Counterpoint:  preventing attainder by demanding congruence and 
 proportionality 
Interestingly, the ACORN appeal‘s academic amici, in advocating for a 
strong functionalist approach, call for the adoption of a standard of review 
                                                          
 286. Id. at 474 (explaining that the ―punitive confiscation of property‖ is prohibited by 
the Bill of Attainder Clause). 
 287. E.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866) (declaring that a 
clergyman‘s deprivation of employment through the imposition of a loyalty oath is ―within 
the inhibition of the Federal Constitution‖); see also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 
316–17 (1946) (announcing that the Constitution does not permit Congress to sentence 
individuals ―to perpetual exclusion from any government employment‖). 
 288. See STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (condemning the legislature‘s assumption of the 
―judicial magistracy‖ as an ―irresponsible despotic discretion‖). 
 289. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990) (explaining 
that the ―difficult judgments . . . as to the common good‖ and the spending of ―public funds‖ 
is reached by Congress); Hart‘s Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880) (placing absolute control 
of public funds in the hands of Congress, noting that ―Congress is responsible . . . only to 
the people‖), aff’d, 118 U.S. 62 (1886).  
 290. See Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) (leaving the 
appropriative decision-making process entirely to Congress as a ―practical question 
addressed to the lawmaking department‖); cf. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 
(1960) (deeming judicial inquiries of congressional motives ―a hazardous matter‖). 
 291. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 609–10 (observing that social security benefits are 
noncontractual government benefits); id. at 617 (expressing that ―the mere denial of a 
noncontractual governmental benefit‖ is not a punishment that runs afoul of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause). 
 292. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850) (explaining that even if 
there is a claim or judgment against the United States, if Congress has not made an 
appropriation, then the claim ―cannot and should not be paid by the Treasury‖).  
  
akin to the congruence and proportionality test applied in City of Boerne v. 
Flores
293
 in lieu of the rational basis approach.
294
  The amici have 
substantial jurisprudential support for their position, relying on legal 
conclusions made by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit
295
 as well as dicta from the Supreme Court‘s more recent 
attainder jurisprudence.
296
  The scholars‘ standard would make the mere 
existence of a nonpunitive rationale insufficient to satisfy the attainder 
inquiry as they claim the ―nonpunitive purpose must itself support the 
singling out of the targeted individuals or groups.‖297 
Harmonizing an attainder analysis with a congruence and proportionality 
test certainly has its appeal.  It would ensure that Congress, in passing bills 
targeted at specific individuals or groups, would have to demonstrate a 
legitimate, nonpunitive purpose that outweighs the magnitude of the burden 
imposed, thus requiring some form of ―legislative‖ process.298  
Unfortunately, when applied to bills involving congressional 
appropriations (or the withholding thereof), the congruence and 
proportionality test is unfeasible, if not unconstitutional.
299
  Subjecting 
appropriative legislation to this level of judicial scrutiny would intrude 
upon the province of Congress; the legislature alone has the discretion to 
determine whether ―wisdom or unwisdom‖ resides in its appropriative 
decisions.
300
  Only when the legislature clearly imposes a traditionally 
                                                          
 293. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  The congruence and proportionality test, as established in 
Boerne, dealt with Congress‘ enforcement powers under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See id. at 519.  Because Congress‘ power under section five was limited to 
remedial measures, the Court required legislation enacted through Congress‘ section five 
power to have ―congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end.‖  Id. at 519–20.   
 294. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 200, at 14–15. 
 295. Id. (―[C]ourts require the government to show ‗the need for a legitimate nonpunitive 
purpose and a rational connection between the burden imposed and [the] nonpunitive 
purposes of the legislation.‘‖ (second alteration in original) (quoting Foretich v. United 
States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2003))).  
 296. Id. at 15 (―In such cases [involving the Bill of Attainder Clause], [courts] look 
beyond simply a rational relationship of the statute to a legitimate public purpose for ‗less 
burdensome alternatives by which [the] legislature . . . could have achieved its legitimate 
nonpunitive objectives.‘‖ (quoting Con. Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 350 (2d Cir. 
2002))).  
 297. Id. at 16. 
 298. See id. at 17 (explaining that if there is a ―‗significant imbalance between the 
magnitude of the burden imposed and a purported nonpunitive purpose, the statute‘ . . . is . . 
. an unconstitutional bill of attainder‖ (quoting Foretich, 351 F.3d at 1221)).  
 299. See Carmichael v. S. Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) (requiring that 
judicial intervention in appropriative matters contain a prerequisite of ―a plain case of 
[legislative] departure from every public purpose which could reasonably be conceived‖—
arguably, a rational basis standard (emphasis added)); see also Smith v. Government of the 
Virgin Islands, 329 F.2d 135, 143–44 (3d Cir. 1964) (observing that the ―plain case of 
departure‖ standard established in Carmichael is a ―well-settled principle[]‖ of law). 
 300. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (declining to evaluate the 
―wisdom or unwisdom‖ of Congressional deprivations of social security, concluding that 
  
judicial form of punishment should judicial due process be afforded.
301
  A 
Boerne-type scrutiny is also unpalatable when comparing the history and 
treatment of section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Appropriations Clause; section five is limited in scope and Congress must 
take caution not to exceed its discretion under it,
302
 whereas Congress has 
been accorded near limitless deference in its appropriative decisions.
303
  
Thus, as tempting as the employment of a congruence and proportionality 
test is to ensure some semblance of process, such a standard of scrutiny is 
incompatible with the deference owed to the legislature. 
D. A More Specific Purpose:  Returning to the Originalist Interpretation 
With the current test in disarray, and the doctrines of separation of 
powers and due process supporting the notion that the Bill of Attainder 
Clause was not meant to constrain the appropriations power, there is only 
one analytical structure that the Court could employ to properly assess 
further challenges based on the Bill of Attainder Clause.  This mode of 
analysis does not require reinvention, but rather the contemporary choosing 
of a side; by returning to Justice Frankfurter‘s test that treats the Bill of 
Attainder Clause as a ―very special‖ constitutional organism, the 
constitutional ―collision‖ feared by the literalists can be avoided.304 
Admittedly, the precise contours of Justice Frankfurter‘s approach have 
not been fully defined.  However, his judicial philosophy makes clear that a 
true bill of attainder requires at least three elements:  the specification of 
both an offense and an individual,
305
 a declaration of guilt,
306
 and 
                                                          
―[t]he answer to such inquiries must come from Congress, not the courts‖ (quoting 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 301. E.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946) (declaring a statute that 
effectively denied three individuals the right to paid employment is an unconstitutional bill 
of attainder); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 316, 332 (1866) (striking down 
a Missouri statute requiring an anti-Confederate loyalty oath to practice a vocation and be 
gainfully employed). 
 302. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (explaining that the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s history supports the idea that the Enforcement Clause was 
intended to be used as a limited, remedial device, rather than as a means of changing the 
substance of constitutional rights). 
 303. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990) (explaining 
that the Court defers to Congress ―to assure that public funds will be spent according to the 
letter of the difficult judgments reached by Congress as to the common good‖). 
 304. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 319, 322 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (identifying a ―very 
special, narrowly restricted, intervention by the legislature‖ as the evil of which the 
Constitution sought to proscribe through the Bill of Attainder Clause). 
 305. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 86 (1961). 
 306. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 322–23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (observing that 
traditionally, a bill of attainder always contained ―a declaration of guilt either of the 
individual or the class to which he belonged‖). 
  
punishment for a past offense.
307
  This set of guidelines maintains the 
separation of powers by reserving the conduct of trials to our judicial 
system, leaving the legislature to promulgate the rules that courts may 
interpret to deem offense and punishment.
308
  Moreover, it conforms more 
closely with the notion that the Framers, in adding the Bill of Attainder 
Clause to our Constitution, knew exactly what bills of attainder actually 
were meant to be,
309
 and did not intend to pit one constitutional provision 
against the other.
310
 
Absent from the originalist dialogue, however, is proper consideration of 
what could constitute ―punishment‖ as prohibited by the Bill of Attainder 
Clause.  ACORN has properly demonstrated how the functionalist 
definition of ―punishment‖ can stretch too far and infringe upon a 
constitutionally vested power that the Court repeatedly has recognized to 
be solely within Congress‘ ambit.311  But little has been said about what the 
proper scope of punishment is under the literalist approach.  In response to 
Ely‘s initial observations regarding the Bill of Attainder Clause, Professor 
Raoul Berger suggested a radically literal interpretation limiting the 
punishment aspect of the Clause to include only those resulting in death.
312
  
This, however, seems entirely incongruent with the most fundamental 
principles of the Court‘s interpretation of the Clause,313 and moreover, 
seems unreasonable in light of the separation of powers arguments.
314
   
                                                          
 307. See id. at 323 (connecting the Bill of Attainder Clause to the Ex Post Facto Clause 
and explaining that the function of both was to prevent punishment for past offenses).  
 308. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (tasking the 
legislature with the prescription of ―general rules for the government of society‖ while 
leaving the interpretation of such laws to ―other departments‖). 
 309. See, e.g., Lovett, 328 U.S. at 321 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (explaining that the 
nature of the Bill of Attainder Clause was very specific, and ―[t]hese specific grievances and 
the safeguards against their recurrence were not defined by the Constitution‖ but ―by 
history‖); Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 430–31 (1868) (Mason, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing that the Framers understood the ―established and technical signification‖ of 
bills of attainder within the unique framework of the Constitution); see also Berger, supra 
note 13, at 361 (examining Justice Story‘s constitutional commentaries for inferences that 
the Framers wrote the Constitution with common law constructs, including those concerning 
attainder, in mind). 
 310. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 319 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (―[E]very rational trail must 
be pursued to prevent collision between Congress and Court.‖). 
 311. See discussion supra Part III.B (analyzing the unconstitutional effects of attempting 
to restrain the congressional appropriations power with the Bill of Attainder Clause). 
 312. See Berger, supra note 13, at 364 (rejecting the idea that the Framers would employ 
the phrase ―bills of attainder‖ to include the ―quite different ‗bills of pains and penalties‘‖).  
 313. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866) (―Within the 
meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties.‖); 
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138 (noting that a bill of attainder may impact ―the life of an 
individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both‖); see also Drehman v. Stifle, 75 
U.S. (8 Wall.) 595, 601 (1869) (describing the Bill of Attainder Clause as ―generical[] and 
embrac[ing] bills of both [pains and penalties and attainder] classes‖).  
 314. Even Justice Frankfurter recognized that the Bill of Attainder Clause enshrined the 
divorce of the judicial function from the legislative branch, and recognized that as such, 
  
Rather, the proper scope of punishment should be limited to ―historical 
punishments‖ traditionally meted out by the judiciary, encompassing both 
bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties.
315
  Such punishments 
include imprisonment,
316
 banishment,
317
 the punitive confiscation of 
property,
318
 and a bar to employment.
319
  This would address the 
functionalist concern that a hyper-technical interpretation of the Clause 
would ―outmode‖ the necessity of the Clause,320 which should serve as a 
meaningful restraint of legislative power
321
 while preventing 
unconstitutional intrusion into the domains of other branches.
322
 
Advocates of the more expansive, functionalist approach, such as 
Professor Ely, question whether the literalist approach is viable.
323
  Ely 
contends that any attempt to ground the attainder clause in history would 
lead to an ―abortive‖ endeavor, and had the Framers truly intended to 
constrain the attainder clause with history‘s definition, they would have 
done so by giving the term bill of attainder ―specific content.‖324  A 
functionalist Court would likely agree.
325
 
However, the separation of powers guarantee that Ely and others seek 
through their expanded view of the Bill of Attainder Clause also would 
                                                          
―[t]he Constitution outlaws this entire category of [bills of attainder and bills of pains and 
penalties].‖  Lovett, 328 U.S. at 324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 315. E.g., Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473–75 (1977) (elaborating on 
the historical definition of punishment and providing examples of traditional punitive 
measures under the Bill of Attainder Clause). 
 316. Id. at 474. 
 317. In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 F. 437, 439 (C.C.D. Or. 1888) (―A legislative act which 
undertakes to inflict the . . . banishment or exile from the United States on a citizen thereof . 
. . is a bill of attainder‖).  But see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) 
(rejecting the concept that deportation is punishment for a crime, explaining that ―[i]t is not 
a banishment . . . but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien‖). 
 318. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 852 
(1984).  
 319. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474 (―Our country‘s own experience with bills of attainder 
resulted in the addition of another sanction . . . :  a legislative enactment barring designated 
individuals . . . from participation in specified employments or vocations . . . .‖). 
 320. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (expressing concern over the 
narrow, technical interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause and explaining that the 
Clause was not designed to be ―outmoded‖ quickly after its inception). 
 321. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (restraining the legislature 
from passing bills of attainder that ―affect the life of an individual, or . . . confiscate his 
property, or . . . do both‖).  
 322. See discussion supra Part III.B (using the ACORN case to demonstrate the potential 
clash between the Congressional appropriations power and the Bill of Attainder Clause 
under an expansive, functionalist approach). 
 323. See generally Ely, supra note 200, at 340–43 (explaining the impossibility of the 
Frankfurterian approach). 
 324. Id. at 342. 
 325. See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 (―The best available evidence, the writings of the 
architects of our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was 
intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition . . . .‖). 
  
include a danger of creating new issues of supremacy.
326
  Combined with 
the fact that other constitutional guarantees can protect individual citizens 
from the concerns that motivate such an expansive interpretation,
327
 there is 
an extant need to steer the attainder laws back to a path of originalism, 
literalism, and strict interpretation.  
CONCLUSION 
If anything is certain about the intent and proper interpretation of the Bill 
of Attainder Clause, it is that much uncertainty still exists.  Interjecting the 
Appropriations Clause into the attainder analysis suggests that the current 
interpretations are unreliable, at best.  But keeping the attainder doctrine on 
its current path will resolve nothing; at its core, it is an awkward 
compromise between two polarized, irreconcilable approaches.  Our 
interpretation of this sparsely used, yet integral, provision of the 
Constitution is in true need of revision; the only viable reconciliation is to 
restore and refine the originalist, Frankfurterian interpretation of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause. 
As for ACORN itself, Congress acted properly in withdrawing its 
funding and prohibiting additional federal funds from reaching the group.  
In terms of responding quickly (and perhaps irrationally) to a political 
crisis, section 163 may have been the sort of knee-jerk, penal legislation 
that the Framers intended to prohibit.
328
  Politically and socially, penalizing 
ACORN may not have been the right thing to do.
329
  However, as a matter 
of law, Congress had an absolute right to prevent federal funds from 
reaching ACORN.
330
   
James O‘Keefe and Hannah Giles, in their politically motivated 
endeavor, accomplished what they sought—the downfall of a public 
                                                          
 326. See discussion supra part III.B. 
 327. E.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 326 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(observing that the Bill of Attainder Clause is ―only one of the safeguards of liberty in the 
arsenal of the Constitution‖ and that ―other provisions . . . specific and comprehensive, [are] 
effectively designed to assure the liberties of our citizens‖).  
 328. See STORY, supra note 28, § 1344 (noting that during instances where the 
legislature faces ―political excitements,‖ it is most likely to ―trample upon the rights and 
liberties of others‖). 
 329. See John Atlas, ACORN Vindicated of Wrongdoing by the Congressional Watchdog 
Office, HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2010, 2:41 AM),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-atlas/acorn-vindicated-of-wrong_b_612265.html 
(discussing the validity, or lack thereof, of accusations made regarding ACORN‘s 
mismanagement of funds).  See generally U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-
648R, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON FUNDING, OVERSIGHT, AND INVESTIGATIONS AND 
PROSECUTIONS OF ACORN OR POTENTIALLY RELATED ORGANIZATIONS (2010) (finding no 
major issues with ACORN‘s use of federal funding). 
 330. See discussion supra Part III.B.  
  
interest group they perceived as their enemy.
331
  But in what seems to be a 
bittersweet coda for ACORN, the authenticity of the duo‘s work has been 
heavily challenged.
332
  Still, the legacy of the scandal remains.  Perhaps 
ACORN suffered a ―social taint‖ of sorts, but it is not a stigma that the 
Constitution, with its Bill of Attainder Clause, guards against.   
 
                                                          
 331. See Larry Neumeister, ‘We’re On Life Support,’ Says ACORN Chief Outside Court, 
As U.S. Fights Funding Ruling, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 20, 2010, 9:25 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/04/were_on_life_support_says_acor.html 
(describing ACORN‘s precarious financial situation in the aftermath of the O‘Keefe 
scandal).   
 332. See, e.g., CAL. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, supra note 145, at 8–9 (examining the controversy 
surrounding the deceptive editing of the released ACORN videotapes).  
